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I. Introduction
A. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C.
§ 181, et seq., the basic statute authorizing 
mineral leasing on the public lands, does not 
specifically address environmental pro­
tection. The only reference arguably dealing 
with environmental protection is found in 
Section 30 of the Act, which provides that 
the Secretary shall require certain provi­
sions in each lease, including "provisions 
for the purpose of insuring the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, skill, and care in the 
operation of said property; a provision... for 
the prevention of undue waste...and such 
other provisions as he may deem neces­
sary... for the protection of the interests of 
the United States,...and for the safeguarding 
of the public welfare...." 30 U.S.C. § 187. 
1. The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments of 
1976 amended the Mineral Leasing Act 
provisions concerning the issuance of 
coal leases, and require the Secretary 
to consider the environmental impacts of 
issuing a coal lease. 30 U.S.C.
§ 201(a)(3)(C).
Environmental laws passed mainly in the 
1970's (e.g., the Clean Water Act, Clean Air
B.
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; 
Endangered Species Act, etc.) apply to op­
erations on mineral leases. Beyond requiring 
compliance with those laws, the Secretary's 
power to manage lease operations (for exam­
ple , to preserve subjective scenic values) is 
determined largely by the terms of the lease 
contracts, including "stipulations" attached 
to them, and his regulations in effect when 
the leases were issued. It has long been 
held that when the United States "comes down 
from its position of sovereignty and enters 
the domain of commerce, it submits itself to 
the same laws that govern individuals there." 
Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875). 
This means that in determining the respective 
rights of the Secretary and mineral lessees, 
the courts will look to general contract law 
principles. See Rosebud Coal Sales Co. V. 
Andrus, 667 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1982) 
(involving interpretation of federal coal 
lease).
C. The lease terms typically included in federal 
mineral leases, as well as the Secretary's 
regulations, give the Secretary broad power
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to regulate mineral operations on tlie leases 
in order to protect the environment. The 
lease form and regulations for oil and gas 
leases illustrate this.
The federal oil and gas lease form now in ef­
fect provides that the "rights granted are 
subject to applicable laws, the terms, condi­
tions, and attached stipulations of this 
lease, the Secretary of the Interior's regu­
lations and formal orders in effect as of 
lease issuance, and to regulations and formal 
orders hereafter promulgated when not incon­
sistent with lease rights granted or specific 
provisions of this lease." (Form 3100-11, 
March 1984). The lease form also contains 
the following clause concerning the conduct 
of operations:
"Sec. 6. Conduct of operations— Lessee shall 
conduct operations in a manner that minimizes 
adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, 
to cultural, biological, visual, and other 
resources, and to other land uses or users. 
Lessee shall take reasonable measures deemed 
necessary by lessor to accomplish the intent 
of this section. To the extent consistent 
with lease rights granted, such measures may 
include, but are not limited to, modification 
to siting or design of facilities, timing of 
operations, and specification of interim and 
final reclamation measures. Lessor reserves 
the right to continue existing uses and to 
authorize further uses upon or in the leased 
lands, including the approval of easements of 
rights-of-ways. Such uses shall be
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conditioned so as to prevent unnecessary or 
unreasonable interference with rights of les-
S 0 0  •
Prior to disturbing the surface of the leased 
lands, lessee shall contact lessor to be ap­
prised of procedures to be followed and modi­
fications or reclamation measures that may be 
necessary. Areas to be disturbed may require 
inventories or special studies to determine 
the extent of impacts to other resources. 
Lessee may be required to complete minor in­
ventories or short term special studies under 
guidelines provided by lessor. If in the 
conduct of operations, threatened or endan­
gered species, objects of historic or scien­
tific interest, or substantial unanticipated 
environmental effects are observed, lessee 
shall immediately contact lessor. Lessee 
shall cease any operations that would result 
in the destruction of such species or ob­
jects . "
E. The Secretary's regulations governing oil and
gas operations provide that "the lessee shall 
conduct operations in a manner which protects 
the mineral resources, other natural re­
sources and environmental quality." 43
C.F.R. § 3162.5-l(a) (1984). Furthermore,
"the lessee shall exercise due care and dili­
gence to assure that leasehold operations do 
not result in undue damage to surface or 
subsurface resources or surface improve­
ments." 43 C.F.R. § 3162.5-1(b) (1984).
F. Despite this broad power to mitigate environ­
mental impacts from mineral lease operations, 
environmental groups frequently object to the
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issuance of mineral leases or, alternatively, 
argue that the Secretary should attach a 
stipulation to the lease reserving the power 
to prohibit operations if he later decides 
that the environmental impacts are 
unacceptable. While recognizing the Secre­
tary's broad power to mitigate environmental 
impacts by regulating the manner, method, 
timing and location of lease operations, the 
courts have held that in the absence of spe­
cific power to deny development, the lease 
gives the lessee the right to explore for and 
develop the minerals on a lease. See Sierra 
Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); Union Oil Company of California v. 
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975); Sun Oil 
Company v. United States, 572 F.2d 786 (Ct. 
Cl. 1978).
II. The Consideration of Environmental Protection at 
the Lease Issuance Stage
A. Discretion to lease
1. The Mineral Leasing Act gives the Secre­
tary discretion to decide not to issue a 
lease at all. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 
U.S. 1 (1965). Thus, if the Secretary
concludes that the environmental
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consequences of mineral activities on a 
proposed lease would be unacceptable, he 
can simply not issue a lease.
2. An exception to this rule applies to the 
issuance of "preference right coal 
leases" to holders of prospecting per­
mits issued prior to the Federal Coal 
Leasing Amendments of 1976. Such leases 
cannot be rejected for environmental 
reasons. NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The 1976 amendments 
eliminated the prospecting per- 
mit/preference right coal lease system.
B. Limitations on Secretary's discretion
1. The Mineral Leasing Act does not place 
any restrictions on the Secretary's dis­
cretion to lease or not to lease. How­
ever, Congress has placed various re­
strictions on his discretion in other 
statutes. These restrictions relate 
primarily to leasing in wilderness and 
wilderness candidate areas.
2. As of January 1, 1984, new leasing was
barred in designated wilderness areas by 
the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.
$ 1133(d)(3).
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3. New leasing is currently prohibited in 
four types of wilderness candidate areas 
RARE II areas recommended for wilder­
ness designation, RARE II further plan­
ning areas, BLM wilderness study areas 
and Congressionally designated wilder­
ness study areas —  by a "rider" at­
tached to the Department of the Interior 
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
for fiscal year 1985. Pub. L. No. 
98-473, Section 308, 98 Stat. 1871.
This leasing ban expires on October 1, 
1985, but there is no indication that it 
will be lifted for fiscal year 1986.
The ban has been in effect since October 
1982.
Comment: Congress's increasing use of
appropriation measures as vehicles to 
amend substantive legislation has been 
criticized. Among other things, the ap­
propriations committees generally do not 
have the experience or expertise in nat­
ural resource and environmental matters 
that the substantive committees have.
The Senate and House rules also
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discourage, if not prohibit, attaching 
substantive legislation to appropriation 
acts. Yet the courts have generally en­
forced such measures, although "an 
amendment will not readily be inferred" 
and the intent of Congress to effect 
such a change "must be clearly mani­
fest." New York Airways, Inc, v. United 
States, 369 F.2d 743, 749 (Ct. Cl.
1966).
4. The National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") requires the Secretary to con­
sider the environmental impacts of 
issuing mineral leases. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332. If the impacts are "signifi­
cant," the Secretary is required to pre­
pare an environmental impact statement. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C ). However, NEPA 
does not place any substantive con­
straints on the Secretary's discretion 
to issue mineral leases. See Strycker's 
Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc, v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. V. 
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
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5. The Interior Board of Land Appeals, 
which issues final decisions for the 
Secretary, has held that the Bureau of 
Land Management (which administers the 
leasing program for the Secretary) can­
not reject a lease unless (1) it has 
considered leasing with restrictive 
stipulations to protect the environment 
(Robert G. Lynn, 76 IBLA 383) and (2) 
the record supports BLM1s conclusion 
that the public interest would be served 
by rejection of the lease application 
(Eagle Exploration Co., 69 IBLA 96).
6. Another limitation on the Secretary's 
authority to decide not to issue leases 
is that, depending on the circumstances, 
such a decision may amount to a with­
drawal of public land which must be re­
ported to Congress under the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act
("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c). In 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. 
Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980), 
the court found that the Secretary's in­
action for several years on oil and gas
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lease applications in areas of Wyoming, 
Idaho and Montana because of the RARE I 
and II wilderness studies constituted a 
withdrawal that had to be reported to 
Congress.
C. Issuance of leases with environmentally pro­
tective stipulations
1. In recent years, the Secretary has been 
attaching various stipulations when 
issuing new leases, particularly in en­
vironmentally sensitive areas. The Sec­
retary's objective is to inform the les­
see of potential restrictions on his 
normal lease development rights, and to 
retain the contractual authority to con­
trol environmental impacts. In addi­
tion, as noted above, the Board of Land 
Appeals has held that a lease should not 
be rejected if stipulations will ade­
quately protect the environment.
2. Certain of these stipulations are now 
standard, e.g ., the Department of the 
Interior's "surface disturbance" stipu­
lation (form 3109-5), the stipulation 
for lands under jurisdiction of the
-10
Department of Agriculture (form 3109-3) 
and the Forest Service Supplement to 
form 3109-3. Others are classified as 
"special" stipulations, and they include 
a wildlife protection stipulation, a 
"cultural resource" protection stipula­
tion, a "Jackson Hole Area oil and gas" 
stipulation, a "coordinated exploration" 
stipulation, a "wilderness protection" 
stipulation for BLM wilderness study 
areas (see 44 Fed. Reg. 72031 (Dec. 12, 
1979)), a "further planning area" stipu­
lation for RARE II further planning 
areas, a "conditional no surface occu­
pancy" stipulation and a "contingent 
right" stipulation (see 47 Fed. Reg♦ 
18158 (April 28, 1982)). For the most 
part, these stipulations condition 
drilling and development operations on 
obtaining prior approval from the Secre­
tary. However, whether the Secretary 
has the power actually to deny approval 
of the necessary permit or to place con­
ditions on development that would make 
operations uneconomical is seldom 
spelled out.
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3. In Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Attachment A), 
the court interpreted the Secretary's 
power under several of these stipula­
tions. In that case, BLM and the Forest 
Service had attached the standard sur­
face disturbance stipulations (forms 
3109-3, 3109-5, and 3109-3 Supp.), the 
further planning area stipulation, the 
coordinated exploration stipulation, the 
Jackson Hole Area stipulation and the 
conditional no surface occupancy stipu­
lation to all or part of leases in a 
RARE II further planning area. The 
court found that only the conditional no 
surface occupancy (NSO) stipulation au­
thorizes the Secretary to preclude ex­
ploration or development on the leases. 
The other stipulations merely authorize 
the Secretary to mitigate the impacts of 
the operations by regulating the loca­
tion of well-sites, construction of ac­
cess roads etc., and do not take away 
the lessee's right to develop. A copy 
of the NSO stipulation at issue in
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Sierra Club v . Peterson is Attachment B.
A copy of the "contingent right" stipu­
lation, which was not involved in Sierra 
Club v. Peterson, but which is a clearer 
statement of the Secretary's attempt to 
reserve the contractual authority to 
prohibit development, is Attachment C.
4. The Secretary's statutory power to im­
pose a stipulation reserving authority 
to prohibit development anywhere on a 
lease was not squarely in issue in 
Sierra Club v. Peterson, and has not 
been tested in the courts. It could be 
argued that the Mineral Leasing Act does 
not authorize the Secretary to so condi­
tion a lease. For example, in other 
statutes Congress has specifically given 
the Secretary the power to prohibit de­
velopment for environmental reasons.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (dealing with off­
shore oil and gas leases) and 30 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (dealing with coal exploration 
licenses). It has not done so for 
onshore oil and gas and other mineral 
leases. In this regard, the Wilderness
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Act of 1964 merely provides that mineral 
leases issued in designated wilderness 
areas shall contain "reasonable stipula­
tions ... for the protection of the wil­
derness character of the land consistent 
with the use of the land for the purpos­
es for which they were leased...." 16 
U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (emphasis added).
Ill. NEPA Developments Concerning Issuance of Onshore 
Oil and Gas Leases
A. NEPA requires an environmental impact state­
ment (EIS) for any major federal action "sig­
nificantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment...." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
Since NEPA was enacted in 1970, only one EIS 
has been prepared for the issuance of onshore 
oil and gas leases. That EIS was for leasing 
in the Washakie Wilderness Area of Wyoming. 
Interior and the Forest Service (where Na­
tional Forest lands are involved) more typi­
cally prepare "environmental assessments" of 
leasing and conclude that an EIS is not re­
quired because the impacts will not be sig­
nificant. Where multiple-use public lands 
are involved that have no potential for con­
sideration as wilderness, Interior often
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relies on a "categorical exclusion" from en­
vironmental review in its NEPA implementing 
regulations and does not prepare even an en­
vironmental assessment. This categorical ex­
clusion provides that except in certain 
specified unusual circumstances, neither an 
EIS nor an EA is necessary for the "issuance 
of individual non-competitive upland oil and 
gas leases." 46 Fed Reg. 7492, 7495 (Jan.
23, 1981).
B. In Sierra Club v. Peterson, supra, 717 F.2d
at 1409, the Sierra Club appealed the issu­
ance of oil and gas leases in the "Palisades" 
area of Idaho and Wyoming, a RARE II further 
planning area. The Forest Service had pre­
pared an environmental assessment and made a 
finding of no significant impact. As noted 
above, the leases were issued subject to nu­
merous stipulations. In particular, the con­
ditional no surface occupancy (NSO) stipula­
tion was attached to all areas that the 
Forest Service determined were "highly envi­
ronmentally sensitive," about 80 per cent of 
the area. Leases on the remaining 20 per 
cent were issued subject to other
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stipulations, but not the NSO stipulation.
The Sierra Club contended that an EIS was re­
quired for the leases issued without NSO 
stipulations. Finding that such leases 
granted lessees the right to explore for and 
develop oil and gas, and that the impacts of 
such activities in the Palisades could be 
"significant" under NEPA, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the Secretary ei­
ther had to prepare an EIS or reserve the au­
thority to prohibit activities that would 
cause unacceptable impacts to the environment 
by appropriate stipulations. On remand to 
the district court, the NSO stipulation was 
attached to the leases.
C. There has been some question as to the appli­
cation of Sierra Club v. Peterson (also known 
as the "Palisades" decision) beyond the facts 
of that case. In that case, the lands were 
under study for wilderness, and the terrain 
was mountainous. Furthermore, the environ­
mental assessment was expressly limited to 
exploration only and incorrectly assumed that 
leasing was in effect a paper transaction 
which would not result in any "physical or
-16
717 F .2d at 1413.biological impacts."
Thus, the court concluded that the finding of 
no significant impact "is not supportable on 
this record." Id. (emphasis added). The 
Palisades decision does not appear, there­
fore, to establish a per se rule that the is­
suance of oil and gas leases anywhere on pub­
lic lands requires an EIS or NSO stipulation.
D. In environmentally sensitive or wilderness 
areas, however, the Palisades decision may 
lead to greater reliance by the Secretary on 
NSO or contingent right stipulations. The 
Secretary is reluctant to prepare costly and 
time-consuming EIS's for onshore oil and gas 
leases because, historically^ drilling occurs 
on only one in ten of these leases.
E. Possible advantages of using lease stipula­
tions to postpone detailed NEPA review
1. Very few leases reach the drilling stage 
and; where drilling occurs, it usually 
affects only a small portion of the 
lease area (about 4 acres). If the Sec­
retary can postpone the environmental- 
analysis until a site-specific drilling 
proposal is submitted, he can avoid
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attempting to analyze the impacts of es­
sentially hypothetical activities on an 
unknown location, and thus save time and 
money.
2. Oil and gas lessees obviously prefer
leases with development rights, and some 
companies will refuse to accept a lease 
with stipulations in effect taking away 
development rights. However, in some 
cases a lessee may prefer to have a 
lease without development rights rather 
than wait for an EIS to be prepared.
For example, the lessee might need the 
lease not for drilling purposes but to 
complete a "lease block," i.e ., a large 
area under lease. Where there are gaps 
in a potential lease block, it is usu­
ally not prudent to drill a well because 
the drilling, which can be extremely ex­
pensive in areas such as the Overthrust 
Belt in the Rocky Mountains (in excess 
of $10 million for one well), might only 
establish the location of oil and gas 
for the benefit of a competitor. Since 
an oil and gas field can often be
-18-
drained without drilling on every lease, 
a lease without development rights might 
be adequate to protect the lessee1s in­
vestment in drilling the well on a dif­
ferent lease.
F. There are, however, some practical problems 
resulting from the use of such stipulations. 
Depending on how widespread the use of these 
stipulations becomes, it could reduce explor­
atory drilling and the discovery of new do­
mestic oil reserves.
1. Where the stipulations are accepted, the 
lessee is taking a risk that the Secre­
tary may not allow drilling to occur 
after preparation of the appropriate en­
vironmental analysis. Under what cir­
cumstances will the Secretary allow 
drilling? There are no real guidelines 
to apply. Until there is some experi­
ence with the administration of these 
stipulations, it is difficult to gauge 
the extent of the lessee's risk in ac­
cepting the stipulations. Consequently, 
industry will face uncertainties in de­
termining whether to acquire such leases
-19-
and; if so, at what price. And despite 
the risk of not being able to drill, the 
lessee must make annual rental payments 
to the Secretary to maintain the lease. 
2. There are various forms of pre-drilling 
seismic exploration work that sometimes 
require large expenditures of money.
This is particularly true in the 
Overthrust Belt, where the geology is 
extemely complex. In many cases, indus­
try simply cannot commit the funds nec­
essary for such exploration until leases 
with development rights have been ob­
tained. Furthermore, where a number of 
leases in a lease block are subject to 
NSO or contingent right stipulations, 
the risk of not being able to extract 
the oil and gas may discourage explor­
atory drilling.
G. If exploration or development is denied,
should the lessee be entitled to compensa­
tion? The question has not yet arisen. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that the 
lessee accepted the leases with knowledge of 
the risk that development might be denied,
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and is therefore not entitled to compensa­
tion. On the other hand, the Outer Continen­
tal Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et 
seq♦/ which specifically authorizes the Sec­
retary to preclude operations for environ­
mental reasons, provides for payment of com­
pensation to the lessee if exploration or 
development is denied. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
H. A Montana federal district court recently
held that several hundred oil and gas leases 
in the Flathead and Gallatin National Forests 
in Montana were issued in violation of NEPA 
because an EIS was not prepared. Conner v. 
Burford, No. CV-82-42-BU (D. Mont. March 8, 
1985) (Attachment D). Although the facts of 
the case are not entirely clear from the 
court's opinion, it appears that some of the 
leases had been issued with NSO stipulations; 
others had not been. With respect to the 
leases without NSO stipulations, the court 
merely stated that Sierra Club v. Peterson 
requires an EIS. The court did not discuss 
the quality of the environmental assessment, 
the reasonableness of the agencies1 finding 
of no significant impact, or the character of
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the land involved. (The court referred to 
the area as "potential wilderness" in its 
opinion, but all of the Flathead and parts of 
the Gallatin National Forest were allocated 
to nonwilderness during the Forest Service's 
RARE II program.) With respect to the leases 
with NSO stipulations, the court disregarded 
Sierra Club v. Peterson and held that an EIS 
was required for those leases as well. The 
court did not discuss the D.C. Circuit's con­
clusion that under the NSO stipulation the 
Secretary can prohibit operations and thus no 
commitment has been made.
1. The extent to which the court's opinion 
affects the issued leases is not clear 
because none of the lessees were ever 
joined as defendants in the case. Fed­
eral oil and gas lessees are generally 
indispensable parties to any suit that 
would adversely affect their rights 
under the leases. See, e.g ., Naartex 
Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2399 (1984).
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IV. Environmental Considerations After Leases are Is­sued
A. Lessees must obtain a permit from the Secre­
tary before they can conduct any surface dis­
turbing activities on the leases. See 43 
C.F.R. § 3162.3-1. If the proposed activity 
would "significantly" affect the environment, 
an EIS must be prepared. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C ).
B. The Secretary has the power to impose certain
mitigation measures on operations after 
leases are issued. However, as noted above, 
in the absence of a stipulation giving him 
the power to do so, he cannot impose require­
ments so stringent as to take away the devel­
opment rights granted by the lease. The Sec­
retary is bound by the lease contract just as 
any other private party is bound by a con­
tract. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 
571, 580 (1934).
C. An example of new conditions imposed after 
mineral leases have been issued is Copper 
Valley Machine Works, Inc v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 
595 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In that case, the Sec­
retary attached a condition to a drilling 
permit allowing drilling during the winter
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season only. While recognizing the Secre­
tary's power to impose such a time limita­
tion, the court also held that the lessee was 
entitled to an extension of its lease for the 
length of time drilling operations were pro­
hibited .
D. Preparation of environmental analyses under 
NEPA for drilling permit applications obvi­
ously takes time, in some cases several 
years. Recognizing that it would be unfair 
to force the lessee to pay rentals and to 
continue the clock running on the lease term 
during this period, the Secretary has sus­
pended leases during the environmental review 
period under Section 39 of the Mineral Leas­
ing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 209. Suspending the 
lease term enables the Secretary to prepare 
the required environmental analysis while 
also giving the lessee the full benefit of 
his lease, as the court in Copper Valley held 
he was entitled to.
E. In granting suspensions, the Secretary gener­
ally includes language providing for the ter­
mination of the suspension if certain events 
occur. A pending case involves the
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interpretation of language concerning the 
termination of a suspension, and the authori­
ty of the Secretary to take away development 
rights after a lease has been issued without 
such a condition. In Sierra Club et al., 80 
IBLA 251, 264 (May 2, 1984), the Board of 
Land Appeals determined that the following 
language in the lease suspension created au­
thority to prohibit all drilling activity 
(which therefore required full consideration 
of the no-action alternative in the EIS pre­
pared for the drilling permit):
Suspensions are for an indefinite period of 
time, subject to automatic termination on the 
first of the month in which (1) the lessees 
and unit operator are notified in writing of 
the decision not to approve any oil and gas 
drilling operations within the Bear Thrust 
Unit area on the basis of its determination 
that such operations would result in 
unacceptable impacts on the wilderness char­
acteristics of the area, or (2) actual ap­
proved drilling operations are commenced 
should it be decided to permit the drilling 
of the well.
The Board held that the Secretary had author­
ity to alter the lessee's development rights 
because delays caused by the lessee rather 
than the government necessitated the suspen­
sion. Id. The lessee has challenged the 
Board's decision on the grounds that (1) the
-25-
Secretary did not intend to reserve authority 
to prohibit all drilling activity; (2) the 
Secretary lacks authority under the Mineral 
Leasing Act to deprive the lessee of develop­
ment rights by means of a lease suspension; 
and (3) the IBLA erred in concluding that the 
lessee's conduct necessitated the lease sus­
pension. Getty Oil Company v. Clark, No. 
84-432 (D. Wyo.). The case is pending on 
cross motions for summary judgment.
V. Impact Of Environmental Protection Measures on
Valid Existing Rights
A. Congress has generally grandfathered "valid 
existing rights" in implementing new regula­
tory programs. For example, the Wilderness 
Act of 1964 prohibition of any "commercial 
enterprise" within the National Wilderness 
Preservation System is made "subject to ex­
isting private rights." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). 
Similarly, all of the provisions of FLPMA re­
pealing a host of public land statutes and 
instituting a number of new programs, 
including review of lands managed by the Bu­
reau of Land Management for possible designa­
tion as wilderness, are made subject to 
"valid existing rights." 90 Stat. 2786, 43
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U.S.C. § 1701 (note). The objective has been 
to negate any implication that Congress was 
authorizing the federal agencies involved to 
"take" private property rights in carrying 
out the new programs.
B. Congress has generally not attempted to de­
fine the rights protected or to indicate the 
extent to which such rights might be regu­
lated, leaving both issues to the agencies 
and courts. One explanation lei. Cuuyicoa'o 
iductance to address these issues is that 
many private property rights are determined 
by state law. This is not the case, however, 
for mineral leases on the public lands.
C. What are valid existing rights?
1. The Solicitor of the Department of Inte­
rior issued an opinion in 1981 generally 
discussing the nature of "valid existing 
rights" protected under FLPMA. 88 I.D. 
90 (Attachment E). With respect to fed­
eral mineral leases, he concluded that 
oucu i t a o c o  weie valid existing rights, 
although the extent of the rights pro­
tected would depend on the statute under 
which the leases were issued, the terms
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of the lease contracts and the stipula­
tions attached.
2. Oil and gas leases are frequently in 
conflict with wilderness, particularly 
in the Overthrust Belt region of the 
Rocky Mountains. The Solicitor's opin­
ion means that development on such 
leases cannot be unreasonably restricted 
or denied unless the leases are subject 
to a stipulation giving the Secretary 
the power to preclude development. If 
the Secretary wants to condemn the 
leases, he must obtain the authority to 
do so from Congress.
3. The Interior Department's Office of Sur­
face Mining has been struggling with the 
definition of "valid existing rights” 
under Section 522(e) of the Surface Min­
ing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e). That 
section prohibits surface coal mining 
operations on specified categories of 
lands, subject to "valid existing 
rights." OSM's 1979 regulations defined 
valid existing rights under this 
provision to mean, in part:
-28-
(a) except for haul roads, (1) Those 
property rights in existence on August 
3, 1977, that were created by a legally 
binding conveyance, lease, deed, con­
tract or other document which authorizes 
the applicant to produce coal by a sur­
face coal mining operation; and (2) The 
person proposing to conduct surface coal 
iiiining on such lands... (i) Had been val­
idly issued, on or before August 3,
1977, all State and Federal permits nec­
essary to conduct such operations on 
those lands...
44 Fed. Reg. 15342 (1979); 30 C.F.R.
§ 761.5 (1980). Judge Flannery struck 
down this definition in 1980 because he 
concluded that a good faith attempt to 
obtain all permits before the August 3, 
1977 cut off date should suffice for 
meeting "all permits" test. In re: Per­
manent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga­
tion I, 14 ERC 1083 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 
1980). In 1981, the D.C. Circuit re­
manded the appeals of the Flannery deci­
sion for further consideration in light 
of Secretary Watt's stated intent to 
significantly revise the SMCRA regula­
tions. In 1983, OSM published a new 
definition of valid existing rights 
under Section 522 of SMCRA:
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Except for haul roads, that a person 
possesses valid existing rights for an 
area protected under section 522(e) of 
the Act on August 3, 1977, if the appli­
cation of any of the prohibitions 
contained in that section to the proper­
ty interest that existed on that date 
would effect a taking of the person's 
property which would entitled the person 
to just compensation under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.
48 Fed. Reg. 41349 (1983); 30 C.F.R.
§ 761.5 (1984). This new definition was 
challenged Gii v" I. j ■onmental groups, and
Judge Flannery recently held that it was 
promulgated without the required notice 
and comment because it differed substan­
tially from the new definition proposed 
in 1982. In re: Permanent Surface Min­
ing Regulation Litigation II, 22 ERC 
1557 (D.D.C. March 22, 1985).
D. What is the extent of the valid existing
rights protection?
1. The extent of the protection depends on 
the statute and regulations in effect 
when the lease was issued, and the terms 
of the lease contract itself. See So­
licitor's valid existing rights opinion, 
supra (Attachment E).
-30
2. Even if a lease conveys certain valid 
existing rights, it is still subject to 
reasonable regulation by the Secretary. 
In other words, exploration and develop­
ment operations can be made more diffi­
cult and more expensive in order to pro­
tect the environment. However, the 
Secretary cannot go so far in his regu­
lation as to make operations 
unreasonably difficult or expensive, and 
he obviously cannot deny operations al­
together without obtaining condemnation 
authority from Congress. See Utah v. 
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1010 (D. Utah 
1979) (regulations may not "be so pro­
hibitively restrictive as to render the 
land incapable of full economic develop­
ment” ) .
3. Whether stringent regulation amounts to 
a taking depends on the circumstances of 
each case. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 
51, 65 (1979).
4. In a recent decision involving the valid 
existing rights provision of FLPMA, a 
federal district court in California
-31-
held that lands in which the minerals 
were privately owned were not exempt 
from the wilderness study program of 
Section 603 of FLPMA. Sierra Club v. 
Watt, No. S-83-035 (E.D. Cal. April 18, 
1985). The Interior Board of Land Ap­
peals had held that such "split estate" 
lands could not be designated and man­
aged as wilderness study areas because 
"[t]he fee simple mineral estate owned 
by appellant, and the attendant rights 
to use the surface, are unquestionably 
'immune from denial and extinguishment 
by the exercise of secretarial discre­
tion.' To designate such lands as WSA's 
and to engage in formal studies of them 
to ascertain whether they are suscepti­
ble to management as a permanent part of 
the wilderness system is to engage in 
futile and pointless exercises with pre­
ordained results, akin to commissioning 
a study of water to determine if it is 
dry." Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 64 
IBLA 27, 34 (1982). In reaching a con­
trary conclusion, the district court
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noted that the private mineral rights 
were still protected during the wilder­
ness study. With respect to one mineral 
owner's argument that placement in wil­
derness study status reduces the market 
value of its property, the court noted 
that whether this effect would amount to 
a taking of private rights without just 
compensation is a question to be ad­
dressed in another suit. Slip op. at 
70, n . 55.
5. In Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v.
Watt, 696 F .2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982), the 
court held that the nonimpairment stan­
dard for wilderness study areas desig­
nated under Section 603 of FLPMA applies 
to mineral leases issued before and 
after the enactment of FLPMA. However, 
it pointed out that "[wjhether § 701(h) 
[the valid existing rights provison] 
saves a particular lease is an issue 
that is not before us." Id. at 746, n. 
17.
E. Need for Congressional direction
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1. Congress needs to undertake a comprehen­
sive review of the problems caused by 
simply including boilerplate protection 
of valid existing rights in broad regu­
latory or preservationist legislation 
and dropping the tough problems in the 
laps of federal and state agencies and 
the courts. However, that effort seems 
unlikely to occur. Indeed, Congress 
continued its usual practice in the last 
Congress in connection with many of the 
statewide wilderness statutes it en­
acted. For example, yielding to pres­
sure from wilderness organizations, Con­
gress added a controversial area in 
Wyoming to the National Wilderness Pres­
ervation System even though it was sub­
ject to oil and gas leases on which an 
application for permit to drill (and 
litigation challenging the approval of 
the permit) was pending. Congress made 
a special effort to protect such rights 
as the affected lessees might be able to 
establish by providing specific pro­
tection for such rights in addition to
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the basic language in the Wilderness Act 
of 1964 to which all wilderness areas 
are subject. Thus, it created the Gros 
Ventre Wilderness area in Wyoming "sub­
ject to valid existing rights and rea- 
sonable access to exercise such rights" 
(98 Stat. 2808, emphasis added). How 
the courts will view that effort remains 
to be seen.
2. In the wilderness designation context, 
one solution might be to create a spe­
cial management category providing for 
environmental protection but allowing 
mineral development to proceed. For ex­
ample, in the Wyoming Wilderness Act 
Congress designated the portion of the 
Palisades Further Planning Area in 
Wyoming as a "wilderness study area." 
However, because of existing oil and gas 
leases and the high oil and gas poten­
tial of the area, Congress provided that 
oil and gas exploration and development 
in the Palisades "shall be administered 
under reasonable conditions to protect 
the environment according to the laws
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and regulations generally applicable to 
nonwllderness lands within the National 
Forest System." Pub. L. No. 98-550, 
Section 301(C)(1)) 98 Stat. 2811 (empha­
sis added) (Attachment F). Activities 
Other than oil and gas exploration and 
development in the Palisades are subject 
to wilderness management guidelines, 
a. Congress has generally resisted
creation of "third tier" management 
categories) preferring instead to 
designate lands as either 
nonwilderness or wilderness. How­
ever) the conflicts which exist be­
tween mineral development and wil­
derness preservation are not easily 
resolved by adhering to a rigid 
either/or classification system. 
When Congress addresses statewide 
RARE II wilderness bills for Idaho 
and Montana) there may be an effort 
to deal with resource conflicts by 
creating special management 
categories similar to the Palisades 
Wilderness Study Area in Wyoming.
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dence in his possession and declined the 
agency’s request to produce it. To make 
the agency investigate further is one thing; 
but to make it duplicate evidence which the 
employee already possesses (and which, but 
for his negligent failure to obtain permis­
sion, if that is to be believed, he could turn 
over to the agency at once) is quite some­
thing else.
The majority opinion, as I understand it, 
does not reject this basis of distinction, but 
reverses the Board for not expressly stating 
that this was the reason the earlier "duty to 
investigate” cases were inapplicable. That 
imposes a degree of refinement which I find 
inappropriate for such discretionary deci­
sions. I think it no more arbitrary for the 
Board to fail to distinguish its arguably but 
not clearly inconsistent precedent when it 
makes fee-award determinations, than it is 
arbitrary for us to fail to do so when we 
award or deny attorneys’ fees, e.g., Order, 
Greene v. Gibralter Mortgage Investment 
Co., No. 82-1391 (D.C.Cir. May 31,1983); or 
when we deny a motion for stay, e.g., Or­
der, Defenders of Wildlife v. The Endan­
gered Species Scientific Authority, No. 83- 
1019 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 27,1983). For agencies, 
no less than for courts, it is unnecessary to 
provide the same high degree, not merely of 
consistency, but of explicit justification for 
all determinations. For highly discretion­
ary judgments such as the present one it 
suffices, I think, that there are in fact valid 
grounds relied upon by the agency for 
treating the case differently from earlier 
cases. To require that the agency not 
merely allude to those grounds (which it did 
here) but also identify them as the specific 
reason for departing from arguably applica­
ble precedent, is to impose intricacies of 
process reserved for more important and 
less discretionary determinations. In hold­
ing otherwise, the court continues the pro­
gressive complication of agency process and 
encourages the progressive trivialization of 
the business of appellate courts.
SIERRA CLUB, Appellant,
v.
R. Max PETERSON, in his official capaci­
ty as Chief Forester of the United 
States Forest Service, Department of 
Agriculture, et al.
No. 82-1695.
United States Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 16, 1983.
Decided Sept. 13, 1983.
As Amended Sept. 28, 1983.
Sierra Club brought action challenging 
decision by the United States Forest Ser­
vice and the Department of the Interior to 
issue oil and gas leases on lands within two 
national forests without requiring prepara­
tion of environmental impact statement. 
The United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, Aubrey E. Robinson, 
Jr., Chief Judge, upheld decision to issue 
the leases without preparing an environ­
mental impact statement, and plaintiff ap­
pealed. The Court of Appeals, MacKinnon, 
Senior Circuit Judge, held that the Depart­
ment had not complied with the National 
Environmental Policy Act because it sanc­
tioned activities which had potential for 
disturbing the environment without fully 
assessing possible environmental conse­
quences.
Judgment accordingly.
1. Health and Environment <&=> 25.15(6)
An agency’s finding of “no significant 
impact” and consequent decision not to pre­
pare an environmental impact statement 
can only be overturned if the decision was. 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre­
tion; judicial review of an agency’s finding 
of "no significant impact” is not, however, 
merely perfunctory as court must ensure 
that the agency took a “hard look” at envi­
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ronmental consequences of its decision. 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
§ 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.
2. Health and Environment «=> 25.15(6)
In reviewing an agency’s finding of “no 
significant impact” of a proposed action on 
environment so as to preclude necessity of 
preparing an environmental impact state­
ment, court ascertains whether the agency 
took a “hard look” at the problem; whether 
it identified relevant areas of environmen­
tal concern; as to problems studied and 
identified, whether it made a convincing 
case that the impact was insignificant; and 
if there was an impact of true significance, 
whether it convincingly established that 
changes in the project sufficiently reduced 
it to a minimum. National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
4332.
3. Health and Environment 0=25.10(2)
Decision by the United States Forest 
Service and the Department of Interior to 
issue leases constituting an irrevocable com­
mitment to allow some surface-disturbing 
activities, including drilling and road build­
ing, in 28,000 acre “non-highly environmen­
tally sensitive lands” located in two nation­
al forests without requiring an environmen­
tal impact statement violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act because it sanc­
tioned activities which had potential for 
disturbing the environment without fully 
assessing possible environmental conse­
quences. National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.
4. Health and Environment <3=25.10(2)
An environmental impact statement is 
required when critical agency decision is 
made which results in irreversible and irret­
rievable commitments of resources to an 
action which will affect the environment 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 
§ 102, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia (D.C. 
Civil Action No. 81-01230).
Karin P. Sheldon, Denver, Colo., for ap­
pellant.
Claire L. McGuire, Atty., Dept, of Justice, 
Washington, D.C., with whom Robert L. 
Klarquist, Washington, D.C., was on the 
brief for appellees, U.S.A.
R. Brooke Jackson, Denver, Colo., with 
whom John F. Shepherd, Denver, Colo., was 
on the brief for appellees, Wexpro Compa­
ny, et al.
Gerry Levenberg, Washington, D.C., was 
on the brief for Bill J. Maddon, et al.
Before WRIGHT and SCALIA, Circuit 
Judges, and MacKINNON, Senior Circuit 
Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior 
Circuit Judge MacKINNON.
MacKINNON, Senior Circuit Judge:
In proceedings in the district court, the 
Sierra Club challenged the decision by the 
United States Forest Service (Forest Ser­
vice) and the Department of the Interior 
(Department) to issue oil and gas leases on 
lands within the Targhee and Bridger-Te- 
ton National Forests of Idaho and Wyo­
ming. The plaintiff alleged that the leas­
ing program violated the National Environ­
mental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321 et seq. (1976), because no Environ­
mental Impact Statement (EIS) was pre­
pared prior to the action. On cross-motion 
for summary judgment the district court 
upheld the decision to issue the leases with­
out preparing an EIS. Sierra Club v. Pe­
terson, No. 81-1230 (D.D.C. March 31,1982). 
The plaintiff appeals from a portion of the 
judgment and we reverse the decision of 
the district court.
I.
The land originally involved in this dis­
pute encompassed a 247,000 acre roadless 
area in the Targhee and Bridger-Teton Na­
tional Forests of Idaho and Wyoming, 
known as the Palisades Further Planning 
Area. In its most recent Roadless Review
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and Evaluation, RARE II,1 the Forest Ser­
vice designated this entire area as a Fur­
ther Planning Area and consequently, the 
land may be considered for all uses, includ­
ing oil and gas exploration, as long as its 
potential wilderness quality is preserved.
In 1980, the Forest Service received appli­
cations for oil and gas leases in the Pali­
sades Further Planning Area.2 After con­
ducting an Environmental Assessment 
(EA), the Forest Service recommended 
granting the lease applications, but with 
various stipulations attached to the leases. 
Because the Forest Service determined that 
issuance of the leases with the recom­
mended stipulations would not result in sig­
nificant adverse impacts to the environ­
ment, it decided that, with respect to the 
entire area, no Environmental Impact 
Statement was required at the leasing 
stage.
The leasing program approved by the 
Forest Service divides the land within the 
Palisades Further Planning Area into two 
categories—“highly environmentally sensi­
tive” 3 lands and non-highly environmental­
ly sensitive lands. The stipulations at­
tached to each lease are determined by the 
particular character of the land. All of the 
leases for the Palisades contain “standard” 4 
and “special” 5 stipulations. These stipula-
tions require the lessee to obtain approval 
from the Interior Department before un­
dertaking any surface disturbing activity on 
the lease, but do not authorize the Depart­
ment to preclude any activities which the 
lessee might propose. The Department can 
only impose conditions upon the lessee’s use 
of the leased land.
In addition, a No Surface Occupancy 
Stipulation (NSO Stipulation) is attached to 
the leases for lands designated as “highly 
environmentally sensitive.” This NSO Stip­
ulation precludes surface occupancy unless 
and until such activity is specifically ap­
proved by the Forest Service.
For leases without a No Surface Occu­
pancy Stipulation, the lessee must file an 
application for a permit to drill prior to 
initiating exploratory drilling activities. 
The application must contain a surface use 
and operating plan which details the pro­
posed operations including access roads, 
well site locations, and other planned facili­
ties. On land leased without a No Surface 
Occupancy Stipulation the Department can­
not deny the permit to drill; it can only 
impose “reasonable” conditions which are 
designed to mitigate the environmental im­
pacts of the drilling operations. See Joint 
Appendix (JA) at 86a.
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1. Two Roadless Area Review and Evaluations 
(RARE 1 and II) were conducted by the Forest 
Service to evaluate undeveloped areas within 
National Forests in order to recommend appro­
priate areas to Congress for designation as part 
of the National Wilderness Preservation Sys­
tem. See Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et 
seq. (1976).
As a result of RARE II, areas studied by the 
Forest Service were classified as either Wilder­
ness, Non-wilderness or Further Planning Ar­
eas. Further Planning Areas, such as the Pali­
sades, are lands which require additional, more 
intensive study before the Forest Service can 
recommend Wilderness or Non-wildemess sta­
tus to Congress. Until a decision is reached on 
the ultimate status of the land, its present char­
acter is to be maintained.
those areas "with definable environmental 
characteristics which would be irreversibly al­
tered by exploration activities.” Environmen­
tal Assessment for Oil and Gas Exploration in 
the Palisades Further Planning Area, Joint Ap­
pendix (JA) at 150. These areas include lands 
necessary for the protection of threatened or 
endangered wildlife species; lands with slope 
gradients of more than 40%; lands with re­
gionally unique plant or animal species; and 
lands with significant cultural resources. Id.
4. The “standard” stipulations include the Stip­
ulation for lands under jurisdiction of the De­
partment of Agriculture, 3109-3 (JA at 85), the 
Surface Disturbance Stipulation, 3109-5 (JA at 
86a), and the Forest Service Supplement to 
Form 3109-3 (JA at 87).
2. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 226 (1976), authorizes the leasing of lands 
owned by the United States for the purpose of 
oil and gas exploration and development.
3. “Highly environmentally sensitive” areas are
defined in the Environmental Assessment as
5. “Special” stipulations include the Further 
Planning Area Stipulation, the Coordination 
Exploration Stipulation: Standard and Jackson 
Hole Area and others which are specially de­
signed to protect particular environmental con­
cerns. See, e.g., JA at 89-100.
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II.
Following jm unsuccessful administrative 
challenge to the decision to issue all the 
leases in accord with the Forest Service’s 
plan, the Sierra Club sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. 
The Sierra Club argued that leasing land 
within the Palisades without preparing an 
EIS violated NEPA. The federal defend­
ants * responded that because of the finding 
of “no significant impact” contained in the 
Environmental Assessment, it was not nec­
essary to prepare an EIS.
The district court upheld the finding of 
“no significant impact” and the decision to 
lease without preparing an EIS. The court 
based its decision upon the conclusion that 
the lease stipulations were valid and that 
the government could thereby “preclude 
any development under the leases.” Sierra 
Club v. Peterson, No. 81-1230, slip op. at 12 
n. 5 (D.D.C. March 31, 1982). The court 
granted the federal defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, stating that “[t]he stip­
ulations included in the leases . . . will e f­
fectively insure that the environment will 
not be significantly affected until further 
analysis pursuant to NEPA.” at 13-14.
The Sierra Club appeals only that portion 
of the district court’s judgment which in­
volves lands leased without a No Surface 
Occupancy Stipulation. The Sierra Club 
concedes that the Department retains the 
authority to preclude all surface disturbing 
activities on land leased with a NSO Stipu­
lation until further site-specific environ­
mental studies are made. By retaining this 
authority, the Department has insured that 
no significant environmental impacts can 
occur from the act of leasing lands subject 
to the NSO Stipulation.
Approximately 80% of the Palisades was 
designated as highly environmentally sensi­
tive ?.nd, therefore, leased with the NSO
6. The lessees were allowed to intervene as de­
fendants in the district court proceedings. The 
“Wexpro” intervenors include Wexpro Co., 
Sun Exploration and Production Co., Anschutz 
Corp., and Champlin Petroleum Co. These 
companies hold the majority of the leases on 
the Idaho portion of the Palisades. The “Mad-
Stipulation. Only the remainder, approxi­
mately 28,000 acres, is at issue in this ap­
peal. As to this smaller area, the Sierra 
Club contends that the Department cannot 
preclude surface disturbing activities, in­
cluding drilling, on lands leased without the 
NSO Stipulation. The Department has 
only retained, Sierra Club asserts, the au­
thority to "condition” surface disturbing ac­
tivities in an effort to “mitigate” any envi­
ronmental harm which might result from 
the activities. Thus, some surface disturb­
ing activities may result from the act of 
issuing leases without NSO Stipulations on 
lands within the 28,000 acres. Appellant 
asserts, therefore, that the finding of “no 
significant impact” and the decision not to 
prepare an EIS, insofar as land leased with­
in this smaller area is concerned, was im­
proper. Because on these leases the Secre­
tary cannot preclude surface disturbing ac­
tivity, including drilling, the Sierra Club 
argues that the decision to lease is itself the 
point of irreversible, irretrievable commit­
ment of resources—the point at which 
NEPA mandates that an environmental im­
pact statement be prepared. We agree.
III.
The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) requires preparation of an Envi­
ronmental Impact Statement whenever a 
proposed major federal action will signifi­
cantly affect the quality of the human envi­
ronment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) (1976). 
To determine the nature of the environmen­
tal impact from a proposed action and 
whether an EIS will be required, federal 
agencies prepare an environmental assess­
ment. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) & (c) (1982). 
If on the basis on the Environmental As­
sessment the agency finds that the pro­
posed action will produce “no significant
dox” intervenors include Bill J. Maddox, Ruth 
Maddox, Kenneth F. Cummings, A.W. Fleming 
and Co., and Placid Oil Co. These individuals 
and enterprises are also lessees of the lands at 
issue.
Both groups of intervenors participated in 
this appeal.
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impact on the environment, then an EIS 
need not be prepared. at § 1501.4(e).
[1] An agency’s finding of "no signifi­
cant impact” and consequent decision not to 
prepare an EIS can only be overturned if 
the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. Cabinet Mountains 
Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681 
(D.C.Cir.1982); Committee for Auto Re­
sponsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992, 1002 
(D.C.Cir.1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 915, 
100 S.Ct. 1274, 63 L.Ed.2d 599 (1980). Judi­
cial review of an agency’s finding of “no 
significant impact” is not, however, merely 
perfunctory as the court must insure that 
the agency took a “hard look” at the envi­
ronmental consequences of its decision. 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 
21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1976).
[2,3] Cases in this circuit have em­
ployed a four-part test to scrutinize an 
agency’s finding of “no significant impact." 
The court ascertains
(1) whether the agency took a “hard 
look” at the problem;
(2) whether the agency identified the rel­
evant areas of environmental con­
cern;
(3) as to the problems studied and identi­
fied, whether the agency made a con­
vincing case that the impact was in­
significant; and
(4) if there was an impact of true signifi­
cance, whether the agency convinc­
ingly established that changes in the 
project sufficiently reduced it to a 
minimum.
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, supra, 685
F.2d at 682. Applying the foregoing test to 
this agency decision, we are satisfied that 
the agency has taken the requisite “hard 
look” and has “identified the relevant areas 
of environmental concern.” However, in 
our opinion, the finding that “no significant 
impact” will occur as a result of granting 
leases without an NSO Stipulation is not 
supportable on this record.
The finding of “no significant impact” is 
premised upon the conclusion that the lease
stipulations will prevent any significant en­
vironmental impacts until a site-specific 
plan for exploration and development is 
submitted by the lessee. At that time, the 
federal appellees explain, an appropriate 
environmental analysis, either an Environ­
mental Assessment or an EIS, will be pre­
pared. In bifurcating its environmental 
analysis, however, the agency has taken a 
foreshortened view of the impacts which 
could result from the act of leasing. The 
agency has essentially assumed that leasing 
is a discrete transaction which will not re­
sult in any “physical or biological impacts." 
The Environmental Assessment concludes 
that there will be no significant adverse 
effects on the human environment due to 
oil and gas lease issuance. Therefore, no 
environmental impact statement will be 
prepared. The determination was based 
upon consideration of the following fac­
tors . . .  (a) few issued leases result in 
active exploration operations and still 
fewer result in discovery or production of 
oil or gas; (b) the act of issuing a lease 
involves no physical or biological impacts; 
(c) the cumulative environmental effect 
of lease issuance on an area-wide basis is 
very small; (d) effects of lease activities 
once permitted will be mitigated to pro­
tect areas of critical environmental con­
cern by appropriate stipulations including 
no-surface occupancy; (e) if unacceptable 
environmental impacts cannot be correct­
ed, activities will not be permitted; and 
(f) the action will not have a significant 
effect on the human environment.
Finding of No Significant Impact, Environ­
mental Assessment, JA at 26-27. The con­
clusion that no significant impact will occur 
is improperly based on a prophecy that ex­
ploration activity on these lands will be 
insignificant and generally fruitless.
While it may well be true that the major­
ity of these leases will never reach the 
drilling stage and that the environmental 
impacts of exploration are dependent upon 
the nature of the activity, nevertheless 
NEPA requires that federal agencies deter­
mine at the outset whether their major 
actions can result in “significant” environ­
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mental impacts. Here, the Forest Service 
concluded that any impacts which might 
result from the act of leasing would either 
be insignificant or, if significant, could be 
mitigated by exercising the controls provid­
ed in the lease stipulations.
Even assuming, arguendo, that all lease 
stipulations are fully enforceable, once the 
land is leased the Department no longer has 
the authority to preclude surface disturbing 
activities even if the environmental impact 
of such activity is significant. The Depart­
ment can only impose “mitigation” meas­
ures upon a lessee who pursues surface dis­
turbing exploration and/or drilling activi­
ties. None of the stipulations expressly 
provides that the Department or the Forest 
Service can prevent a lessee from conduct­
ing surface disturbing activities.7 Thus, 
with respect to the smaller area with which 
we are here concerned, the decision to allow 
surface disturbing activities has been made 
at the leasing stage  and, under NEPA, this 
is the point at which the environmental 
impacts of such activities must be evaluat­
ed.
[4] NEPA requires an agency to evalu­
ate the environmental effects of its action 
at the point of commitment. The purpose 
of an EIS is to insure that the agency 
considers all possible courses of action and 
assesses the environmental consequences of 
each proposed action. The EIS is a deci­
sion-making tool intended to “insure that
7. We do not agree with the district court’s 
unsupported conclusion that the Secretary can 
preclude “any development” under the lease. 
Sierra Club, supra, slip op. at 12 n. 5. In 
addition to the fact that the lease stipulations 
themselves do not expressly permit preclusion, 
when questioned on this point at oral argu­
ment, counsel for the government stated:
The government has never contended that we 
would preclude all development. We did in 
fact contend before the district court . . .  that 
in the Conditional No Surface Occupancy ar­
eas, those that are highly sensitive, we could 
preclude development.
In response to the court’s question as to wheth­
er the agency could refuse to approve a lessee’s 
plan to build an access road (a surface disturb­
ing activity) during exploration, counsel for the 
government stated:
There’s a very fine line between preclusion 
and strict control. The agency has retained
. . . environmental amenities and values 
may be given appropriate consideration in 
decisionmaking . . . ” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2XB). Therefore, the appropriate 
time for preparing an EIS is prior to a 
decision, when the decisionmaker retains a 
maximum range of options. Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 852- 
53 (9th Cir.1979). Accord, Port o f Astoria 
v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 478 (9th Cir.1979) 
(NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared 
“at an early stage when alternative courses 
of action are still possible. . .  . ”); Scientists' 
Inst, for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic 
Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (In determining when to prepare 
an EIS the agency must ascertain to what 
extent its decision embodies an “irretrieva­
ble commitment” of resources which pre­
cludes the exercise of future “options.”). 
An EIS is required when the “critical agen­
cy decision” is made which results in “irrev­
ersible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources” to an action which will affect the 
environment. Mobil Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 562
F.2d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1977). On the facts of 
this case, that “critical time,” insofar as 
lands leased without a NSO Stipulation are 
concerned, occurred at the point of leasing.
Notwithstanding the assurance that a la­
ter site-specific environmental analysis will 
be made, in issuing these leases the Depart­
ment made an irrevocable commitment to 
allow some surface disturbing activities, in-
strict control. They have the authority. 
They have the right to put certain conditions 
on road building.
[The government has] never contended 
that we could preclude all exploration and all 
development in these non-highly sensitive ar­
eas.
Furthermore, counsel for the Sierra Club as­
serted without contradiction that the govern­
ment could not deny an application for a permit 
to drill, but could only enforce the lease stipula­
tions to control and/or mitigate any environ­
mental damage which result from the drilling.
We conclude from the language of the lease 
stipulations, the briefs of the parties, and the 
statements of counsel at oral argument that 
once the land is leased the Secretary cannot 
preclude surface disturbing activities, in either 
the exploratory or the development stage, on 
the 28,000 acres here in question.
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eluding drilling and roadbuilding. While 
theoretically the proposed two-stage envi­
ronmental analysis may be acceptable, in 
this situation the Department has not com­
plied with NEPA because it has sanctioned 
activities which have the potential for dis­
turbing the environment without fully as­
sessing the possible environmental conse­
quences.
The Department asserts that it cannot 
accurately evaluate the consequences of 
drilling and other surface disturbing activi­
ties until site-specific plans are submitted. 
If, however, the Department is in fact con­
cerned that it cannot foresee and evaluate 
the environmental consequences of leasing 
without site-specific proposals, then it may 
delay preparation of an EIS provided that 
it reserves both the authority to preclude all 
activities pending submission of site-specific 
proposals and the authority to prevent pro­
posed activities if the environmental conse­
quences are unacceptable. If the Depart­
ment chooses not to retain the authority to 
preclude all surface disturbing activities, 
then an EIS assessing the full environmen­
tal consequences of leasing must be prepar­
ed at the point of commitment—when the 
leases are issued. The Department can de­
cide, in the first instance, by which route it 
will proceed.
Department retains the authority to pre­
clude all surface disturbing activities pend­
ing submission of a lessee’s site-specific pro­
posal as well as the authority to refuse to 
approve proposed activities which it deter­
mines will have unacceptable environmental 
impacts, then the Department can defer its 
environmental evaluation until such site- 
specific proposals are submitted. If, how­
ever, it is unable to preclude activities 
which might have unacceptable environ­
mental consequences, then the Department 
cannot issue leases sanctioning such activi­
ties without first preparing an EIS.
Because we find that the Department did 
not comply with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act when it 
leased the 28,000 acres of non-highly envi­
ronmentally sensitive lands within the Pali­
sades, we reverse the judgment of the dis­
trict court and remand the case for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opin­
ion.
Judgment accordingly.
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IV.
The National Environmental Policy Act 
requires federal agencies to evaluate the 
environmental consequences of their actions 
prior to commitment to any actions which 
might affect the quality of the human envi­
ronment. If any “significant” environmen­
tal impacts might result from the proposed 
agency action then an EIS must be prepar­
ed before the action is taken.
In this case, the Department failed to 
fully assess the environmental consequences 
of its decision to issue leases without NSO 
Stipulations on the 23,000 acres in question. 
To comply with NEPA, the Department 
must either prepare an EIS prior to leasing 
or retain the authority to preclude surface 
disturbing activities until an appropriate 
environmental analysis is completed. If the
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ATTACHMENT B
C o n d i t i o n a l  No S u r f a c e  Occupancy S t i p u l a t i o n
Toe 1 ez_s.ee agrees not to occupy or use the surface of the leased lanes
la (lega l description) except foroffice:certain limited uses as permitted in writing by at authorized
agency. This stipulation, at a later cate, naythe su rfa ce  aanagenen: 
he n o t i f ie d , svrppl ntec. eliminated, or rent it  ut chatted. A l te r a t i o
of the stimulation u t i l he conditional upon the preparation o: a s ite -
specific enviromental assessment, or i f  .required, 
statement. In the event
at environmental
this stipulation is eliminated, it vill he
replaced hy a coordinated eccploraticn stipulation and other special 
stipulations as required to protect the surface resources.
Notices
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DEPARTMENT Of AGRICULTURE
Forest Service ! V - \ . V  .**- J
Test ot a Donrinperri Right Stipuiarboo 
to be lociubed tn Geothermal and 
Noncompetitive OB and Gas le a se s
a c e n o t . F o re s t  S e rv ice , USD A. . 
a c t io n : N o tic e  .
summary: Toe ? crest Service 
announces that it wiD recommend or 
consent to issue oD end gas and 
geothermal leases which itirdnrir a 
contingent right stipulation. Areas wiD 
.-"^“.selected on which to test the use cd 
stipulation. Criteria art heron 
■•.•.v;:;:icrussed ior selection of areas where 
the stipulation-will be nsec. This action 
is consistent with thet of the Department 
of the Interior widen approved the use of 
a contingent right stipulation on 
noncompetitive oil and gas leases cn 
February 24.1922. .
EFFECTIVE date May 28. 1982. 
address: R. Max Peterson. Chief Forest 
Service, USD A- Rm. 833-RPZ. P.0. Bex- 
2417, Washington. D-C. 20013.
FDR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert F. May, Forest Service, USD A. 
Minerals and Geology Management 
Staff. P.O. Bax 2417, Rm. 803^RFE, 
Washington, D.C. 20013. (703) 235-S718.
SUPPLEMENT ART INFORMATION: T h e
Forest Service administers 
approximately 19CL7 million acres of 
National Forest System lends, most of 
which are e variable for oil and gas cr 
geothermal leasing. Over 7,000 lease 
applications ior National Forest System 
lands ere filed each year with the 
Bureau of Land Management (ELM). The 
Forest Service is responsible for 
determining if tlease proposal is . 
compatible with other resource usei‘ 
.::u:3n d  if so. under what conditions 8 lease 
O^ySill be issued. Until now the Forest 
eroce examined tech application
separately.-or coDectively if applications 
could be logically grouped. In 
conducting environmental analysis of a 
lease application, the Forest Service has 
assumed that issuance of s lease would 
result tn driTlrng and in productive webs 
canting extensive impacts on surface 
resources! Using this assumption as a 
basis for analyzing leasing impacts and 
ior arriving at recommendations to BLMVi»t pmvoi firm* mncn-niTtg »rwt costly E) 
many cases.
Experience has ahown that less than 3 
percent of all Federal oil and gas leases' 
issued nationally are actually drilled, 
end even fewer result in productive 
wells. Tons, the present approach to 
enalyai* on least applications has 
resulted in excessive backlog* and 
expense that hat proven difficult to 
justify. • • - . •’
In several lawsuits involving National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
issues, the courts have endorsed 
segmented rittHainrmiaV'mg.
Segmentation occurs in a Federal 
mineral disposal context where there u 
“separate utility'’ in the granting of 
lease* and the later approval of each 
subsequent stage of operations,. 
including prospecting, exploration, end 
production. . ••
Use of the contingent right stipulation 
ii based on the premise that NEPA 
environmental analyses can he most 
effectively handled at the operational 
stage of the lease. after submission of 
specific proposal Each proposal must he 
approved before operations can begin. 
However, it is expected that rarely will 
the leasee/operator and tire Government 
fail to agree on an acceptable plan of 
operation* and thereby invoke the 
contingent right stipulation.
To test the acceptance and 
workability of the contingent right 
stipulation, the Forest Sendee w01 select 
certain National Forest area* within 
which the stipulation will he considered 
for all geothermal and noncompetitive 
oil and gas leases issued during the test 
period. AD designated wildernesses. 
Congressional}? mandated wilderness 
study area* and Administration- 
endorsed wilderness proposal* will be 
excluded (see 45 FR 26667 of May 14, 
1981). If a roadless area designated ior 
farther planning is selected the 
contingent right stipulation will take 
precedence over the further planning
Fsowsl JLrprUc
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stipulation (tee Forest Serna Manual 
2822.43). Tne stipulation wfl] not be 
applied to leases issued under the 
simultaneous filing sysiejn. .
No environmental assessment prior to 
leasing wOl be necessary for leases to • 
he issued subject to the contingent right 
stipulation. Tne contingent right 
stipulation will he used in those areas - 
where additional protection is needed 
beyond that provided by standard lease 
term* mn conditions. If it is determined 
tint the contingent right stipulation w£D - 
not he used, the usual environmental - ., 
assessment process w21 he followed. In ' 
either situation, standard lease term* ' • 
end condition* wiD be required in the 
leases.
The tod-of 1be Contingent Ri^it 
SirotUBPcm it as tdlTPVg’E 1 
All operation* on this lease art 
subject to Government approval with 
such site-specific stipule bon* a* may he 
necessary to assure reasonable 
protection of or mitigstion of -efiects on 
other values. A plan of operation* sbaD 
not he approved if it results in 
unacceptable impact on other resources, 
land uses, and/or the environment. If for 
these reasons e plan of operations- • „ 
cannot be approved, the lease term may 
be suspended for up to 5 years subject to 
timely submittal of an appropriate 
application by the lessee for c 
suspension of operating and producing 
• requirements of the lease and approval . 
by the United States. L1 the conditions 
do not change sufficiently, and/or 
significantly improved technique* are 
not developed such that a plan of 
operations has not been approved - • 
during the suspended term of the least, 
the suspension shall automatically •" • 
terminate. Unless relinquished sooner, 
the leese will continue for the term 
remaining at the effective daie of the . 
suspension or, if Dot suspended, for the 
term remaining when the plan of 
operation* was disapproved, subject to 
Government approval of all operation* 
as provided herein, without recourse for 
compenstion. •
Dougin R. Lein,
Axtodole Chief."  .
April 221882. . . -[TR Doc E-51S5* fW <-©-e: tc us)BtUUWC CODE X10-1V-K
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B e f o r e  t h i s  c o u r t  a r e  m o t i o n s  f o r  summary judgment 
by p l a i n t i f f s  James R. Conner and t h e  Montana W i l d l i f e  
F e d e r a t i o n  a n d  by d e f e n d a n t s  T h e  B u r e a u  o f  Land  
Management, th e  F o r e s t  S e r v i c e ,  and o t h e r s ,  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  
i s s u a n c e  o f  o i l  and g a s  l e a s e s  o f  v a s t  a r e a s  o f  t h e  
F la thead  and G a l l a t i n  Nat ion a l  F o r e s t s .  J u r i s d i c t i o n  over  
t h i s  a c t i o n  i s  based on 28 U.S.C.  §1331.
P l a i n t i f f s  a sk  t h e  c o u r t  t o  d e c l a r e  u n l a w f u l  t h e
d e c i s i o n s  by the  Chief  o f  the  F o r e s t  S e r v i c e ,  th e  D i r e c to r
o f  the  Bureau o f  Land Management and t h e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e
I n t e r i o r —to_der»y . p l a i n t i f f  s ‘ p r o t e s t s  and appea ls  a g a i n s t
th e  i s s u a n c e  o f  o i l  and gas l e a s e s  in th e  F l a t h e a d  and t h e  
(\LS-o c F  'pu^vfs t* P<tTeazos
G a l l a t i n  N a t i o n a l  F o r e s t s .  P l a i n t i f f s  c o n t e n d  t h a t  
d e f e n d a n t s  v i o l a t e d  t h e  N a t i o n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P o l i c y  A c t
( "NEPA") , 4 2  U . S . C .  § § 4 3 2 1  e t  s e q .  , by f a i l i n g  t o  p rep a re
. -—■ ■ ' 1 *> 
and c o n s i d e r  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impact  s t a t e m e n t s  ( " E I S " )  p r i o r
t o  m a k i n g  d e c i s i o n s  w h i c h  w i l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t  t h e
---- — ■ ■—    ■■■■ —■ —   ~  ■ ■ —  ■ —  —  — ' *»
e n v i r o n m e n t s  o f  t h e  f o r e s t s  i n  q u e s t i o n .  F u r t h e r  , 
p l a i n t i f f s  c l a i m  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  Endangered S p e c i e s  Act  
(" ESA" T~, 16 uTsTcT § § 1 5 3  6 e t  s e q T T by d e f e n d a n t s  Tn 
f a i l i n g  t o  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c o n s u l t  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
F i s h  and W i l d l i f e  S e r v i c e  b e f o r e  t a k i n g  s u c h  a c t i o n .  The
v ■ " "
c o u r t  i s  a s k e d  t o  s e t  a s i d e  t h e  a g e n c y  a c t i o n s  a s  b e i n g  
n o t  in  acc o rd a nc e  w i t h  t h e  above c i t e d  law  under a u t h o r i t y  
o f  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  P r o c e d u r e  A c t ,  5 U .S .C .  § 7 0 6 ( 2 )  ( A ) .  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  p l a i n t i f f s  a s k  t h e  c o u r t  t o  e n j o i n  t h e  
i s s u a n c e  o f  any more l e a s e s  u n t i l  t h e  a g e n c i e s  comply w i t h  
NEPA and ESA.
T h e  f e d e r a l  d e f e n d a n t s  a s s e r t  t h e y  c o m p l i e d  w i t h  
NEPA and ESA by c o n d u c t i n g  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s s e s s m e n t s  
( " E A ' s " ) ,  o b t a i n i n g  b i o l o g i c a l  o p i n i o n s ,  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  
v a r i o u s l y  a p p l i e d  s t i p u l a t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a No S u r f a c e  
O c c u p a n c y  S t i p u l a t i o n  ("NSO"),  i n  t h e  l e a s e s  which  rend er  
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  im pact  and t h e  d a n g e r  t o  t h r e a t e n e d  and  
e n d a n g e r e d  s p e c i e s  a t  t h e  l e a s i n g  s t a g e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  
D e f e n d a n t s  a s s e r t  t h a t  s u b s e q u e n t  a n a l y s i s  a n d  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,  b a s e d  on i n d i v i d u a l  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  f u r t h e r
------a c t i v i t y  on t h e  l e a s e s ,  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  u p h o l d  t h e
mandates  o f  NEPA and ESA.
2
The NEPA c h a l l e n g e  r e q u i r e s  t h e  c o u r t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
w h e t h e r  t h e  f e d e r a l  d e f e n d a n t s  i n i t i a t e d  a "major f e d e r a l  
a c t i o n  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  human 
e n v i r o n m e n t . . . . »  4 2 U . S . C .  § 4 3 3 2 ( 2 ) ( C ) .  I f  t h e
d e fe n d a n t s  d i d  i n i t i a t e  such an a c t i o n ,  t h e y  a r e  r e q u i r e d  
t o  p r e p a r e  and a n a l y z e  an e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impact s t a t e m e n t  
b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g . w h a t  a c t i o n  s h o u l d  o c c u r .  I d . The  
s t a n d a r d  o f  r e v i e w  o f  th e  d e c i s i o n  t o  fo r e g o  an EIS a t  th e  
l e a s i n g  s t a g e  i s  t h a t  o f  r e a s o n a b l e n e s s .  F o u n d a t i o n  f o r  
N o r t h  Am erican  Wild Sheep v .  U . S . , 681 F .2d  1172 (9 th  C i r .  
1 9 8 2 ) .  T h i s  c o u r t  f i n d s  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  f o r e g o  an 
E IS  was  u n r e a s o n a b l e .  The E I S  s h o u l d  s e r v e  t o  a s s i s t  
a g e n c i e s  in  making d e c i s i o n s  b e f o r e  any s i g n i f i c a n t  s t e p s  
a r e  taken which may damage the  environment .
A c e n t r a l  p u r p o s e  o f  an EIS i s  t o  
f o r c e  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i m p a c t s  i n  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s .
( c i t a t i o n s  o m i t t e d . )  That  p u r p o s e  
r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  NEPA p r o c e s s  be 
i n t e g r a t e d  w i th  agency p l a n n i n g  a t  
t h e  ' e a r l i e s t  p o s s i b l e  t i m e , '  40  
C . F . R .  § 1 5 0 1 . 2 ,  a n d  t h e  p u r p o s e  
^ a n n o t  b e  f u l l y  s e r v e d  i f  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  c u m u l a t i v e  
e f f e c t s  o f  s u c c e s s i v e ,  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  s t e p s  i s  d e l a y e d  
u n t i l  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  h a s  a l r e a d y  
been t a k e n .
1 .  THE NATIONAL ENV]HONMENTAL PO LICY ACT
P e t e r s o n ,  No.  8 4 - 3 8 8 7  ( 9 t h  C ir .  Feb. 11 ,  1985)
4
Thomas v,
s l i p .  op.  a t  6 .
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In t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  l e a s i n g  s t a g e  i s  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e
o f  a number o f  s u c c e s s i v e  s t e p s  w h i c h  c l e a r l y  m e e t  t h e
" s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t "  c r i t e r i o h  t o  t r i g g e r  an E1S.
'
([L e a s e s  w i t h o u t  NSO s t i p u l a t i o n s  h a v e  b e e n  s e t  a s i d e  
f o r  l a c k  o f  NEPA c o m p l i a n c e  b e c a u s e  t h e y  f a i l  t o  e n s u r e  
t h a t  e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  damaging a c t i v i t y  can be p r e c l u d e d  by 
t h e  f e d e r a l  a g e n c y .  S i e r r a  C l u b  v .  P e t e r s o n , 717 F . 2 d  
1 4 0 9  ( D . C .  C i r .  1 9 8 3 ) .  T h i s  r u l i n g  c l e a r l y  e x t e n d s  t o
l e a s e s  w h i c h  a l l o w  s u r f a c e  o c c u p a n c y  on any p a r t  o f  t h e
l e a s e d  a c r e a g e .
T h i _ s  c o u r t  i m . t  t h „ r P f n r P  
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  o f  l e a s i n g  l a n d s  w h i c h  h ^ .  NSQ 
s t i p u l a t i o n  c o v e r i n g  th e  e n t i r e ^ 7 ^ 7 7 ^ 7 2 ^ 7  
t h e  NSO s t i p u l a t i o n  as  a m e c h a n i s m  t o  a v o i d  an Els when
i s s u i n g  n u m e r o u s  l e a s e s  on p o t e n t i a l  w i l d e r n e s s  a r e a s  
c i r c u m v e n t s  t h e  s p i r i t  o f  NEPA. S u b s e q u e n t  s i t e - s p e c i f i c
a n a l y s i s ,  p r o m p t e d  by a p r o p o s a l  f rom  a l e s s e e  o f  on e  
t r a c t ,  may r e s u l t  i n  a f i n d i n g  o f  no  s i g n i f i c a n t  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  impact .  O b v i o u s l y ,  a co m p r e h e n s iv e  a n a l y s i s
o f  c u m u l a t i v e  i m p a c t s  o f  s e v e r a l  o i l  and g a s  d e v e l o p m e n t
a c t i v i t i e s  m u s t  be done b e f o r e  a n y  s i n g l e  a c t i v i t y  ca n  
p r o c e e d .  O t h e r w i s e ,  a p i e c e m e a l  i n v a s i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e s t s  
‘w o u ! 3  o c c u r ^  f o l l o w e d  by th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  a s i g n i f i c a n t
and i r r e v e r s i b l e  i m p a c t .  S e e  e . g . , Cady v .  M o r t o n , 527  
F . 2d 786  ( 9 t h  C i r .  1 9 7 5 ) ;  T r o u t  U n l i m i t e d  v .  Morton, 509 
F . 2d 1276 ( 9 t h  C i r .  1974);  40 C . F . R .  5 1 5 0 8 . 2 7 ( b ) ( 7 ) .
4
not  guarantee  an EIS b e f o r e  any d e v e l o p m e n t  would o c c u r .  
I n  f a c t ,  NSO s t i p u l a t i o n s  c a n  be m o d i f i e d  or removed  
w i t h o u t  an EIS. G a l l a t i n  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  A n a l y s i s ,  p a g e  3 
( d i s c u s s i n g  r e e v a l u a t i o n  o f  NSO s t i p u l a t i o n s  in the  Crazy  
Mountains r o a d l e s s  a r e a ) .  This  c o u r t  i s  c o m p e l l e d  t o  s e t  
a s i d e  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  d e f e n d a n t s  t o  l e a s e  w i t h o u t  
p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  an EIS.  The idea o f  p o s s i b l e  s i t e  s p e c i f i c  
a s s e s s m e n t s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  d o e s  n o t  c o m p l y  w i t h  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  a r e a  f o r  p o s s i b l e  w i l d e r n e s s  
d e s i g n a t i o n .
. . . t h e  p r o m i s e  o f  a s i t e  s p e c i f i c  
EIS in  t h e  - f u t u r e  i s  m e a n i n g l e s s  
i f  l a t e r  a n a l y s i s  c a n n o t  c o n s i d e r  
w i l d e r n e s s  p r e s e r v a t i o n  a s  an  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  d e v e lo p m en t .
C a l i f o r n i a  v .  B l o c k , 690 F . 2 d  753 a t  7 6 2 - 7 6 3  ( 9 th  C i r .  
1 9 8 2 ) .
I I .  ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The s e c o n d  i s s u e  b e f o r e  t h e  c o u r t  i n v o l v e s  f e d e r a l  
agen cy  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  E n d a n g e r e d  
S p e c i e s  Act  ("ESA"). 16 U .S .C .  §§1531 e t  s eq .  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .
P l a i n t i f f s  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  
b i o l o g i c a l  o p i n i o n s ,  p r e p a r e d  by t h e  F i s h  and W i l d l i f e  
S e r v i c e  a s  mandated by S e c t i o n  1 5 3 6 (b)  o f  ESA. The c o u r t  
f i n d s f e d e r a l  d e f e n d a n t s *  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  ESA t o  be  
a n a lo g o u s  t o  t h e i r  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  NEPA. The b i o l o g i c a l  
o p i n i o n s  ex a m in e  t h e  e f f e c t s  r>f o i l  and  o a s  a c t i v i t y  -only-
s o  f a r  as  the  l e a s i n g  s t a g e ,  a s s e r t i n g  la ck  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n
t o p r o j e c t  c o n s e q u e n c e s  of  f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t .  Here  
f t g a i n , t h e  d e f e n d a n t s  r e l y  on s t i p u l a t i o n s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  
t h r e a t e n e d  a n d  e n d a n g e r e d  s p e c i e s  when  s u b s e q u e n t  
i n t r u s i o n  i n t o  t h e  c r i t i c a l  h a b i t a t s  o c c u r s .  T h e
p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a p i e c e m e a l  i n v a s i o n  o f  h a b i t a t  i s  p r e s e n t
w h e n  t h e  a g e n c y  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  l e a s e  w i t h o u t  a
d e v e l o p m e n t .  S e e , N o r t h  S l o p e  B u r r o u g h  v .  A n d r u s , 6 4 2  
F . 2 d  589 ( D. C.  C i r .  1 9 8 0 ) .  The e n v i r o n m e n t a l  a s s e s s m e n t s  
o f  b o th  t h e  F l a t h e a d  and  t h e  G a l l a t i n  w a r n  t h a t  t h i s  
p i e c e m e a l  a p p r o a c h  c o u l d ' l e a d  t o  " . . . a  c h i p p i n g  away and 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o f  i m p o r t a n t  h a b i t a t . . . . "  F l a t h e a d  EA 
p . 1 0 9 - 6 ,  G a l l a t i n  EA App. D p . 7 .
The m a n d a t e  o f  t h e  E n d a n g e r e d  S p e c i e s  A c t  i s  t o  
o b t a i n  a c o m p r e h e n s i v e  B i o l o g i c a l  O p i n i o n  d e s i g n e d  t o  
c o n s e r v e  e n d a n g e r e d  l i f e  and t h r e a t e n e d  s p e c i e s  and t h e i r  
e c o s y s t e m s .  1 6  U . S . C .  § 1 5 3 1 .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t s '  p u r p o s e  h e r e  was t o  e x p e d i t i o u s l y  i s s u e  o i l  
and gas l e a s e s .
I I I .  CONCLUSION
Th e  f e d e r a l  a g e n c i e s  v i o l a t e d  t h e  p r o c e d u r a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  NEPA by f a i l i n g  t o  p r e p a r e  an EIS  on t h e
e f f e c t s  o f  o i l  a n d  g a s  a c t i v i t y  on  t h e  F l a t h e a d  and  
G a l l a t i n  N a t i o n a l  F o r e s t s .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  t h e y  v i o l a t e d
ESA by f a i l i n g  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a l l  s t a g e s
o f  o i l  and gas  a c t i v i t y  on the  f o r e s t s . - —
6
T h e r e f o r e ,  under  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o£ 5 U . S . C .  §70G,  
th e  a g e n c y  a c t i o n s  a l l o w i n g  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f t h e  o i l  and 
g a s  l e a s e s  on t h e  F l a t h e a d  ‘and G a l l a t i n  N a t i o n a l  F o r e s t s
a r e  HEREBY SET ASIDE. The d e f e n d a n t s  a r e  e n j o i n e d  from
f u r t h e r  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  l e a s e  and i s s u a n c e  o f  l e a s e s
p en d in g  compliance  w i th  NEPA and ESA.
P l a i n t i f f s '  m ot ion  fo r  summary judgment i s  GRANTED. 
D efen da n ts '  m ot ion  fo r  summary judgment i s  DENIED. 
P a r t i e s  s h a l l  bear  t h e i r  own c o s t s .
DATED t h i s  day o f  March, 1985.
^  PAUL G. HATFIELD 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT jjbDGE
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the application of the “rule of reason,” 
namely, that impact# need only be con­
sidered (1) which can reasonably be an­
ticipated to occur prior to the completion 
of the project, or (2) which will defi­
nitely occur before or after completion 
of the project under consultation.
I am not persuaded that these limita­
tions should be placed on the “role of rea­
son" test. If other activities (both private 
and governmental) crfn be reasonably an­
ticipated to Impact the endangered spe­
cies or its critical habitat, those impacts 
should be included within the scope of 
the consultation; To exclude considera­
tion of activities and projects which will 
occur after the completion of the project 
under consultation could result in our 
Ignoring Impacts which are likely to 
occur and otherwise cognizable under the 
“rule of reason.” Likewise, projects and 
activities for which administrative dis­
cretion remains should also be con­
sidered. The degree of administrative 
discretion, and the likelihood of that dis­
cretion being exercised in a manner to 
diminish impact on the subject species, 
are matters which should be included un­
der the “rule of reason” te s t 
In conclusion, the opinion of May 25, 
1978 is reissued with the removal of the 
two limitations in the first full paragraph 
on the last page. The "rule of reason” 
test should be used to evaluate Impacts 
which can reasonably be anticipated to 
occur from projects and activities before 
or after the completion of the project 
under consultation or on which adminis­
trative discretion remains. These projects 
and activities, along with their Impacts, 
should be considered and given an appro­
priate weight in the application of the 
“rule of reason.”
The reissued opinion, modified as in­
dicated in this memorandum, is attached.
L eo M. K btjltz
TEE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGE­
MENT WILDERNESS REVIEW 
AND VALID EXISTING RIGHTS
M-36910 (Sapp.)
October 6,
Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976: Wilderness
Valid existing rights are limitations 
upon the Secretary's authority to manage 
activities occurring within wilderness 
''study area under the nonimpairment 
standard. In general, the nonimpairment 
standard remains the management norm 
unless it would preclude enjoyment of the 
rights. When it is determined that the 
rights can be enjoyed only through activ­
ities that will permanently impair an 
area’s suitability, the Secretary must 
manage the lands to prevent unnecessary 
and undue degradation and to afford en­
vironmental protection.
Solicitor’s Opinion M-36910, 86 I.D. 
89 (1979), modified.
OPINION BY OFFICE 
OF THE SOLICITOR
T o :  S ecretary 
F r o m : S olicitor
S u b j e c t : T h e  BLM W ild ern ess  
R ev iew  and  V alid  E x is t in g  
R io h t s
/ . INTRODUCTION
On Sept. 5, 1978, the Solicitor 
issued opinion M-36910, 86 I.D. 89 
(1979), interpreting sec. 603 of the 
Federal Land Policy and Manage­
ment Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1782. In addition, two supplemen­
tary memoranda have been issued. 
The first, the memorandum of Aug.
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7, 1979 (“Palmer Oil/Prairie Can­
yon”), reviewed the “grandfather 
clause” of sec. 603. The second, 
the memorandum of Feb. 12, 1980 
(“Further Guidance on FLPMA’s 
section 603”), discussed the Bureau 
of Land Management’s Interim 
Management Plan and valid exist­
ing rights in the context of mining 
claims located pursuant to the gen­
eral mining laws.
This opinion addresses the rela­
tionship between valid existing 
rights and the wilderness review 
requirements of sec. 603.1 It modifies 
Solicitor’s Opinion No. M-36910 
and incorporates the memorandum 
of Feb. 12,1980.
II. THE NONIMPAIRMENT 
STANDARD AND ITS E X ­
CEPTIONS AND LIMITA­
TIONS
Congress has delegated to the Sec­
retary general and comprehensive 
authority to manage the public 
lands. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, the Secretary “has been 
granted plenary authority over the 
administration of public lands * * * 
and * * * has been given broad au­
thority to issue regulations concern­
ing them.” Best v. Humboldt Placer 
Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336
1 Tbit opinion formalizes and la consistent 
with the position adopted by the Department 
on appeal from the decision of Rocky Moun­
tain Oil d Gas Association v. Andrus, 500 F. 
Sapp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), appeal docketed, 
No. 81-1040 (10th Cir. Jan. 5. 1981). Al­
though consistent with the result reached by 
the court in regard to allowing actlrlties on 
oil and gas leases Issued prior to Oct. 21, 1976 
(pre-FLPMA leases), this opinion does not 
adopt the court's rationale.
(1963). See also Cameron v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 450,459-60 (1920); 
Boesche v. Udal, 373 U.S. 472, 
477-78 (1963). See generally 30 
U.S.C. §§22, 189; 43 U.S.C. §§ 2, 
1712. With the enactment of 
FLPM A, Congress has restricted 
the Secretary’s discretion in man­
aging the public lands by imposing 
two standards to guide management 
decisions. The first is a general 
standard applicable to all manage­
ment activities: “In managing the 
public lands the Secretary shall, by 
regulation or otherwise, take any 
action necessary to prevent unnec­
essary and undue degradation of 
the lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
The second and more stringent limi­
tation is part of the wilderness re­
view mandated by sec. 603 of 
FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. § 1782.
Under sec. 603 of FLPM A, the 
Secretary is directed to review the 
public lands and identify those 
areas that meet the wilderness cri­
teria contained in sec. 2 (c) of the 
Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 
(c). Those areas that have wilder­
ness characteristics are then to be 
studied to determine their suitabil­
ity for'inclusion in the National 
Wilderness Preservation System. 
The Secretary is required to make 
recommendations on their suitabil­
ity or nonsuitability to the Presi­
dent by Oct 21, 1991. In turn, the 
President makes recommendations 
to the Congress which decides which 
areas will be designated wilderness.
Sec. 603(c) establishes a specific 
management standard, known as the 
“nonimpairment standard,” appli-
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under this Act shall be subject to validcable only during this wilderness 
review:
During the period of review  of such 
[wilderness study) areas and until Con­
gress has determined otherwise, the Sec­
retary shall continue to manage 
lands according to his authority under 
this Act and other applicable law In 
manner so as not to impair the suitability 
of such areas for preservation as wilder­
ness, subject, however, to the continua­
tion of existing mining and grazing uses 
and mineral leasing in the manner and 
degree In which the same was'being con­
ducted on the date of approval of this 
A c t: PROVIDED, That, In managing the 
public lands the Secretary shall by regu­
lation or otherwise take any action re­
quired to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands and their re­
sources or to afford environmental pro­
tection.
43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (italics add­
ed). See generally Solicitor’s Opin­
ion M-36910, 86 I.D. 89, 109-11 
(1979).
There is, however, an exception to 
and a limitation on the nonimpair­
ment standard. The exception is the 
section’s grandfather clause which 
authorizes the continuance of exist­
ing mining, grazing, and mineral 
leasing uses, “in the manner and de­
gree” in .which they were occurring 
on Oct. 21, 1976, the date of enact­
ment of FLPMA. This grandfather 
clause was analyzed in both the ini­
tial Solicitor’s Opinion and the 
supplemental memorandum of 
Aug. 7,1979.
The limitation on the nonimpair­
ment standard, and the subject of 
this opinion, is the savings clause of 
sec. 701(h) of FLPMA. This sec­
tion provides:
All actions by the Secretary concerned
existing rights.
43 U.S.C. § 1701 note.
The clause limits the applicabil­
ity of the nonimpainnent standard 
by specifying that the standard can­
not be applied in a manner that 
would prevent the exercise of any 
“valid existing rights.”
III. VALID EXISTING 
RIGHTS
Although the legislative history 
is largely silent on the scope of this 
term,* it is not unique to FLPMA. 
The term has an extensive history 
both in the Department and the 
courts.
In defining “valid existing 
rights,” the Department distin­
guishes three terms: “vested rights,” 
“valid existing rights,” and “appli­
cations” or “proposals.” 3 “Valid ex­
isting rights” are distinguished 
from “applications” because such 
rights are independent of any sec­
retarial discretion. They are prop­
erty interests rather than mere ex­
pectancies. Compare v.
Nickel, 419 F.2d 663, 666-67 (D.C. 
Cir, 1969) and George J. , 56 
I.D. 347, 351 (1938) with Vdall v. 
Tollman, 380 U.S. 1, 20 (1965), 
United Stated ex rel. McLennan V.
* Bee. generally H.R. Bep. No. 1724, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sest. 65 (1976), reprinted in Senate 
Comm, on Energy A Natural Resources, 95th 
Cong„ 2d Seas., LegUlotive History of the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
197S a t '871, 935 (Comm. Print 1978).
•Each of these terms applies only to third 
parties. They do not apply to Interests of fed­
eral agencies, departments, or agents. Bee, e.g., 
Toteneite of Liberty, 40 LB.L.A. 817, 319 
(1979).
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Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420 (1931), 
and Albert A. Howe, 26 I.B.L.A. 
386, 387 (1976). “Valid existing 
rights” are distinguished from 
“vested rights” by degree: they be­
come vested rights when all of the 
statutory requirements required to 
pass equitable or legal title have 
been satisfied.4 Compare v.
United States, 260 U.S. 532, 544 
(1923) with 'Wyoming v. United 
States,255 U.S. 489, 501-02 (1921) 
and Wirth v. Branson, 98 U.S. 118, 
121 (1878). Thus, “valid existing 
rights” are those rights short of 
vested rights that are immune from 
denial or extinguishment by the 
exercise of secretarial discretion.
Valid existing rights may arise 
in two situations. First, a statute 
may prescribe a series of require­
ments which, if  satisfied, create 
l ights in the claimant by the claim­
ant’s actions under the statute with­
out an intervening discretionary 
act. The most obvious example is 
the 1872 Mining Law: a claimant 
who has made a discovery and prop­
erly located a claim has a valid ex­
isting right by his actions under the 
statute; the Secretary has no discre­
tion in processing any subsequent 
patent application. Second, a valid 
existing right may be created as a 
result of the exercise of secretarial 
discretion. For example, although
4,rVested right*” has a narrower meaning 
within public land law terminology than in 
other areas of the law. In public land law, 
“vested rights” typically applies to legal or 
equitable rights to a fee title. See e.g., Wyo­
ming v. United State*, eupra a t 501-02. Oil 
and gas leases, which do not convey fee title, 
have not been couched in terms of the tradi­
tional “vested right” usage.
the Secretary is not required to ap­
prove an application for a right-of- 
way, if  an application is approved 
the applicant has a valid existing 
right to the extent of the rights 
granted. Similarly, the Secretary 
has discretion to approve, deny, or 
suspend an application for an oil 
und gas lease. Once the lease is 
issued however, the applicant has 
valid existing rights in the lease.
Valid existing rights are not, 
however, absolute. The nature and 
extent of the rights are defined 
either by the statute creating the 
rights or by the manner in which 
the Secretary chose to exercise his 
discretion.* See, e.g., Best v. Hum­
boldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 
334 (1963); Continental Oil Co. v. 
United States, 184 F. 2d 802, 807 
(9th Cir. 1950). Thus, it is not pos­
sible to identify in the abstract 
every interest that is a valid exist­
ing right; the question turns upon 
the interpretation of the applicable 
statute and the nature of the rights 
conveyed by approval of an appli­
cation. Because of the importance 
of the individual approval and its 
stipulations, a review of each ap-
• For example, there are Interests less than 
leaseholds that are “valid existing rights.” 
These Include noncompetitive (preference 
right) coal lease applications that were pre­
served by the “valid existing rights” clause 
of sec. 4 of the Federal Coal Leasing Act 
Amendments of 1975, 90 8 ta t 1085, amending 
30 U.S.C. |  201(b) (1970). The Secretary does 
not have the discretion to reject these appli­
cations If the applicant can meet the statutory 
test for lease issuance. Nevertheless, the right 
to a lease does not accrue until that determi­
nation has been made. WRDO v. Berklund, 609 
F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah Interna­
tional, Ine. V. Andru*, 488 F. Supp. 962, 969 
(D. Utah 1979). The right preserved is to an 
adjudication and, if that adjudication is favor­
able, to a lease.
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proval document will be required to 
determine the precise scope of an 
applicant’s valid existing rights 
where such rights are created by an 
act of Secretarial discretion.
IV. REGULATION OF VALID 
EXISTING RIGHTS UNDER 
SEC. 603 OF FLPMA
The determination that a particu­
lar interest is a “valid existing 
right” is a limitation on the con- 
gressionally mandated management 
standard applicable to activities oc­
curring within wilderness study 
areas. Although the nonimpair­
ment standard remains the norm, 
this standard cannot be enforced if 
to do so would preclude recognition 
of the right or, in the case of an 
issued lease, would preclude de­
velopment under the right. In gen­
eral, restrictions on the right de­
signed to protect wilderness values 
may not be so onerous that they 
unreasonably interfere with enjoy­
ment of the benefit of the right. In 
other words, regulations may not be 
“so prohibitively restrictive as to 
render the land incapable of full 
economic development” Utah' v.
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995,1010 (D. 
Utah 1979).
The resolution of specific cases 
under these general guidelines is de­
pendent upon an analysis of two 
variables. The first is the scope of 
developmental rights actually con­
veyed by the person’s actions under 
the statute or by the Department’s 
issuance of the lease or other docu­
ment The second variable is the 
site-specific conditions confronting 
the right holder. In general, how­
ever, the nonimpairment standard 
governs activities unless this would 
unreasonably interfere with enjoy­
ment of the valid existing rights. 
"When the nonimpairment standard 
would unreasonably interfere with 
the use of the rights conveyed, the 
holder of the rights may exercise 
the rights although it impairs the 
area’s suitability for preservation 
as wilderness. For example, under 
such circumstances a claimant with 
a valid mining claim under the 
Mining Law of 1872 may develop 
the claim even if this impairs the 
area’s suitability for wilderness 
preservation. Similarly, the holder 
of an oil and gas lease or a right-of- 
way authorization issued prior to 
the enactment of FLPMA may de­
velop the leasehold or right-of-way 
to the extent authorized by the 
issuance or approval document.
It is important to note the dis­
tinction between pre- and post- 
FLPMA leases and authorizations. 
With the enactment of FLPMA on 
Oct 21, 1976, the Secretary was re­
quired to manage the public lands 
under wilderness review “so as not to 
impair the suitability of such areas 
for preservation as wilderness.” 43 
U.S.C. § 1782(c). Thus applicants 
who received a lease or other use au­
thorization after Oct. 21, 1976, for 
lands within an area under wilder­
ness review did not receive an un­
limited right to develop since after 
that date the Secretary had author-
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ity only to issue those leasee, per* 
mits, and licenses that would not im­
pair an area’s suitability for pres­
ervation as wilderness. gener­
ally Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 
995,1006 (D. Utah 1979).
The right to develop even if it 
impairs an area’s suitability docs 
not, however, mean that the right is 
unlimited. The Secretary remains 
under a statutory mandate to man­
age these areas and their resources: 
“in managing the public lands the 
Secretary shall by regulation or 
otherwise take any action required 
to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands and their 
resources or to afford environmental 
protection.” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).* 
By implication, this standard al­
lows the Secretary to authorize uses 
or activities necessary to the pur­
poses of the valid existing rights 
subject to reasonable mitigating 
measures to protect environmental 
values. The requirement that the 
Secretary regulate uses and activi­
ties to prevent unnecessary and un­
due degradation and to afford en­
vironmental protection is consistent 
with the power of the Federal Gov­
ernment to regulate property inter­
ests. Since the regulation extends at 
a. minimum only to prohibiting ac­
tivities that are not necessary or 
that are excessive or unwarranted, 
the taking issue is not implicated.’
•Bee ole43 D.8.C. |  1732(b).
T These management requirements are com­
patible with the concept of valid existing 
rights. First, such rights may constitutionally 
be regulated and their value diminished for 
a proper governmental purpose. Bee, cp., 
Andrus v. Allard, 100 S.Ct 318 (1979) ; Penn 
Central Tramp. Co. v. City of Ne%o York, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978) ; Goldblatt r. Hempstead, 369
V. CONCLUSION
Valid existing rights may be cre­
ated by operation of a statute or an 
act of secretarial discretion. A valid 
mining claim, an oil and gas lease, 
and a right-of-way authorization 
are examples of valid existing 
rights. I f  such rights were created 
prior to the enactment of FLPMA, 
they limit the congressionally im­
posed nonimpairment standard. A l­
though the nonimpairment stand­
ard remains the norm, valid exist­
ing rights that include the right to 
develop may not be regulated to the 
point where the regulation unreas­
onably interferes with enjoyment of 
the benefit of the right. Resolution 
of specific cases will depend upon 
the nature of the rights conveyed 
and the physical situation within 
the area. When it is determined that 
the rights conveyed can be enjoyed 
only through activities that will 
permanently impair an area’s suit­
ability for preservation as wilder­
ness, the activities are to be regula­
ted to prevent unnecessary and un­
due degradation or to afford en­
vironmental protection. Neverthe­
less, even if such activities impair
U.S. 590 (1902). 81 nee the management stand* 
ard prohibits only “unnecessary and undue 
degradation,” It does not raise constitutional 
issues, Second, the rights granted by the 
United States are often expllclUy limited by 
the government’s authority to regulate. For 
example, the 1872 Mining Law provides that 
"all valuable mineral deposits in lands belong­
ing to the United States • • • shaU remain 
free and open to exploration and pur­
chase • • • under reg prescribed by 
lam.” 30 U.S.C. |  22. Bee generally 30 U.8.C. 
|  189; Boetehe v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 477-78 
(1963) ; United Btotee t. Richardton, 599 
F.2d 290 (9th Clr. 1979), cert, denied, 444 
U.8. 1014 (1980).
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Appeal from decision of the Montana 
State Office, Bureau of Land Manage*  
ment, rejecting simultaneous noncom­
petitive oil and gas lease application 
M 49009.
Affirmed.
1. Oil and Oas Leases: Applications: 
Generally—Oil and Gas Leases: Appli­
cations: Attorneys-in-Fact or Agents
An oil and gas lease application. Form 
3112-1 (June 19S0), Is not completed 
in accordance with regulation 43 CFR 
3112.2-1 or the instructions on the appli­
cation itself where questions (d) through 
(f) are not answered by checking appro­
priate boxes in the application as the in­
structions require.
2. Administrative Authority: 
Laches—Estoppel—Laches
The authority of the United States to 
enforce a public right or protect a public 
interest is not vitiated or lost through 
lack of enforcement by some of its 
officers.
APPEARANCES: Bruce A. Budner, 
Esq., Dallas, Texas, for appellant.
OPINION B Y CHIEF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 
PARRETTE
Clyde K. Kobbeman filed a simul­
taneous noncompetitive oil and gas 
lease application for parcel M T 1 in 
the September 1980 drawing in the 
Montana State Office, Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM). This 
application was drawn with first 
priority and assigned serial number 
M 49009.
On Apr. 30, 1981, BLM issued a 
decision rejecting Kobbeman’s ap­
plication because questions (d),  
(e) , and ( f ) 1 were not completed on 
the back of the application by check­
ing appropriate boxes, which vio­
lates 43 CFR 3112.2-1 (a) (1980). 
Kobbeman appealed this decision.
[1] We agree that appellant’s ap­
plication was not completed and 
that BLM therefore properly re­
jected i t  A simultaneous noncom­
petitive oil and gas lease application 
must be completed (43 CFR 3112.2- 
1(a)) or it must be reiected as an 
improper filing. 43 CFR 3112.6-
1 The portion of the application in question 
is as follows:
“UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIES AS FOL­
LOWS (check appropriate boxes) [emphasis 
in original] :• • # • •
“ (d) Does any party, other than the appli­
cant and those identified herein as other par­
ties in interest, own or hold any interest in 
this application, or the offer or lease which 
may result? Yes Q No Q
“ (e) Does any agreement, understanding, or 
arrangement exist which requires the under­
signed to assign, or by which the undersigned 
has assigned or agreed to assign, any interest 
in this application, or the offer or lease which 
may result, to anyone other than those identi­
fied herein as other parties In Interest? 
Yes □  No D
“ (f) Does the undersigned hare any interest 
in any other application filed for the same par­
cel as this application? Yes □  No Q ”
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WYOMING WILDERNESS ACT 
P.L. 98-550
of-way ©ir ©th«f fer caM projects @a the basis of ony
p re se t of future wilderness eharecteristi®, wUderaeao designa­
tion®, or wilderness etudie© @r evaluations of lands m the Medicine 
Bow National Forest or m Natrona, Sweetwater, @r Carbon Counties 
in Wyoming.
LEGAL DESCRIPTION AND WILDERNESS BOUNDARIES
Sec. 202. As soon as p&rtieable after the enactment of this Act, a 
map and a legal description ©f each area described in titles D and Ell 
shall fee filed with the Committee os Energy and Natural Resources 
of the United State® Senate and the Gomraitte® on Interior and 
Insular Affairs ©f the House of Representatives, and each such map 
and description ©hail have the &ame force and effect a© if included in 
this Act, except that correction of clerical and typographical errors 
in each such legal description and map may fee made. Each such 
map and legal ascription ©hall fee on file and available for public 
inspection in the Office of the Chief of the Forest Service, Depart­
ment of Agriculture.
APPLICATION OF THE WILDERNESS ACT OF 1964
Sec. 203. Subject to valid existing rights, each wilderness area
designated by this Act ©hall be administered fey the Secretary in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Wilderness Act, 
except that any reference in the provisions ©f the Wilderness Act to
the effective date ©f the Wilderness Act ©hall be deemed to be a 
reference to the effective date of this Act.
TITLE ID-WILDERNESS STUDY AREAS
O
Sec. 301. (a) In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act, 
the Secretary of Agriculture shall, upon revision of the initial land 
management plans for the Bridger-Teton, Targhee, and Shoshone 
National Forests required by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable 
Resources Planning Act of 1974, as amended by the National Forest 
Management Act of 1976, review the following lands as to their 
suitability for preservation as wilderness:
(1) certain lands in the Bridger-Teton and Targhee National 
Forest© of Wyoming, which comprise approximately one hun­
dred and thirty-five thousand eight hundred and forty acres, as 
generally depicted on a map entitled "‘Palisades Wilderness 
Study Area—Proposed”, dated September 1984, and which shall 
be known as the Iralisades Wilderness Study Area;
(2) certain lands in the Bridger-Teton National Forest, which 
comprise approximately thirty thousand acres, as generally 
depicted m  & map entitled r"Shoal Creek WDderaess Study 
Area—Proposed”, dated September 1984, and which shall be 
known as the Shoal Creek Wilderness Study Area; and
(3) certain lands in' the Shoshone National Forest of .Wyo­
ming, which comprise approximately fourteen thousand ©even 
hundred acres, as generally depicted on a map entitled “High 
Lakes Wilderness Study Area—Proposed”, dated September 
1984, and which shall be known as the High Lakes Wilderness 
Study Area.
(b) Subsequent to such review the Secretary shall submit his 
reports and findings to the President and the President shall submit
98 STAT. 2810
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jjji recommendations to the Congress within three years of the date 
receipt of the Secretary's report
(c) Subject to valid existing rights and reasonable access to exer­
cise such rights, until Congress determines otherwise, the Palisades, 
High Lakes and Shoal Creek Wilderness Study Areas shall be 
administered by the Secretary of Agriculture so as to maintain their 
presently existing wilderness character and potential for inclusion 
ua the National Wilderness Preservation System: Provided, That—
(1) with respect to oil and gas exploration and development 
activities, the Palisades Wilderness Study Area shall be admin­
istered under reasonable conditions to protect the environment 
according to the laws and regulations generally applicable to 
nonwildemess lands within the National Forest System;
(2) subject to valid existing rights, the Palisades Wilderness 
Study Area as designated by this Act is hereby withdrawn from 
all forms of appropriation under the mining laws;
(3) the provisions of section 308 of the Interior Department 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1984 (Public Law 98-146) or 
similar provisions which may hereafter be enacted concerning 
oil and gas leasing, exploration and development in further 
planning or wilderness study areas shall not spply to the Pali­
sades Wilderness Study Area; and
(4) within the Palisades, High Lakes and Shoal Creek Wilder­
ness Study Areas, snowmobilmg shall continue to be allowed in 
the same manner and degree as was occurring prior to the date 
of enactment of this Act.
TITLE IV-RELEASE OF LANDS FOR MULTIPLE USE
MANAGEMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OP ROADLESS AREAS
S ec. 401. (a) The Congress finds that—
(1) the Department of Agriculture has completed the second 
roadless area review and evaluation program (RARE ID; and
(2) the Congress has made its own review and examination of 
national forest roadless areas in Wyoming and the environmen­
tal impacts associated with alternative allocations of such areas.
(b) On the basis of such review, the Congress hereby determines 
and directs that—
(1) without passing on the question of the legal and factual 
sufficiency of the RARE II final environmental statement 
(dated January 1979) with respect to national forest lands in 
States other than Wyoming, such statement shall not be subject 
to judicial review with respect to National Forest System lands 
in the State of Wyoming;
(2) with respect to the national forest lands in the State of 
Wyoming which were reviewed by the Department of Agricul­
ture in the second roadless area review and evaluation (KARE 
II) and those lands referred to in subsection (d) except those 
lands remaining in wilderness study upon enactment of this Act 
and subject to section 301, that review and evaluation or refer­
ence shall be deemed for the purposes of the initial land 
management plans required for such lands by the Forest and 
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1976 (Public 
Law 94-588) to be an adequate consideration of the suitability of 
such lands for inclusion in the National Wilderness Preserva-
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